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UNITED STATES v. GONZALEZ:* IN SEARCH OF A
MEANINGFUL PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
INTRODUCTION
If New York City were to enact a law imposing a sentence of
life imprisonment on third-offense illegal parkers in an effort to
stem a rising tide of illegal parking, there would be a public out-
cry.1 Behind this outcry would lie the proportionality principle
which dictates that punishment comport with either the degree
of harm caused or the moral blameworthiness of the offending
individual.2 Although legislative bodies wield a great amount of
* 922 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.)(before Cardamone, Miner, Circuit Judges, & Pollack,
District Judge; opinion per Cardamone, J.), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 660 (1991).
1 This hypothetical is based upon the "overtime parking" example utilized in pro-
portionality case law to illustrate an extreme case in which the punishment is undoubt-
edly disproportionate to the offense. Given such a scenario, most jurists agree that a
court would be correct in holding that the punishment would be unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 311 n.3 (1983)(Rehnquist, J., dL-enting)(in extraordi-
nary cases, where reasonable men cannot differ as to the inappropriateness of a punish-
ment, the proportionality principle might apply, but in all other cases courts should de-
fer to the legislature's line-drawing); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 n.3 (1932) (there
could be situations, such as the overtime parking hypothetical, in which the proportion-
ality principle may be applicable); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.l, 288
(1980) (the Court states that the dissents extreme example may bring the proportionality
principle into play); but see Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. CL 2680, 2697 (1991)(plural-
ity)(it is improbable that the "overtime parking" scenario would ever materialize and, if
it did, the problem the punishment was directed at would be so grave that people would
differ over the appropriateness of the punishment).
2 See Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment Challenges
to the Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent
to Precedent," 27 ARiz. L. REv. 25, 26 (1985)("Simply stated, the proportionality doctrine
prohibits a punishment more severe than that deserved by the criminal for the harm
caused and the moral blameworthiness exhibited.").
Although proportionate sentencing may serve broad utilitarian goals designed to in-
still respect for the criminal justice system, see infra note 65 and accompanying text, the
proportionality principle is inherently a retributive concept, concerned with "just des-
serts." Once a defendant has been convicted of a crime, it is just to punish that defend-
ant, but the severity of the punishment should not inflict suffering beyond what the
defendant deserves. In this respect, proportionate sentencing insures that a defendant is
treated as an individual and thus limits the pursuit of utilitarian goals by legislatures.
This is in accord with the Eighth Amendments concern with the dignity of the individ-
ual. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
Anthony Granucci has provided a detailed explanation of how the prohibition of
excessiveness in punishment can be traced back to one of the laws given to Moses by
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discretionary power in defining crimes and fixing sentences to
address societal problems, 3 the proportionality principle serves
as a limit on this power by protecting an individual defendant
from penal policies formulated by elected majorities that con-
sider broad societal needs to the exclusion of individual rights.4
When an appellate court questions whether a specified sen-
tence for a term of years is disproportionate to a crime, it imme-
diately confronts the problem of how to gauge what is propor-
tionate and what is unconstitutionally disproportionate.5 Critics
God, the lex talionis-an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. This is considered to be a
law of retribution. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments In-
flicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 844 (1969). The Federal Sentencing
Commission, in formulating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, took into account that
"appropriate punishment should be defined primarily on the basis of the principle of
'just deserts' . . . [the punishment] scaled to the offender's culpability and the resulting
harms." Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Policy Statement (Nov. 1990). See also
H.LA HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 230-37 (1960); Mundle, Punishment and
Desert, in PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 65 (H. Acton ed., 1969); Bruce W. Gilchrist, Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 1119, 1121 n.13
(1979)("[I]ntuitive justice permits states to punish individuals no more than they de-
serve in light of the gravity of their offenses, thus limiting the potentially inhumane
pursuit of reformation and the protection of society.").
3 [T]here is a certain subordination of the judiciary to the legislature. The
function of the legislature is primary, its exercises fortified by presumptions of
right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly .... We have ex-
pressed these elementary truths to avoid the misapprehension that we do not
recognize to the fullest the wide range of power that the legislature possesses
to adapt its penal laws to conditions as they may exist and punish the crimes
of men according to their forms and frequency.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910). See infra notes 25-30 & 71-73 and
accompanying text.
' See Gilchrist, supra note 2, at 1122 ("The guarantee acts as an independent con-
stitutional limitation on the extent to which a state may impose severe sanctions on
individual offenders to further broad societal goals.").
5 There is a distinction between mere disproportionality and unconstitutional dis-
proportionality. The proportionality principle does not mandate strict proportionality
between crime and sentence but instead guards against punishments that are either
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983), or
"greatly disproportioned," Weems, 217 U.S. at 371. Requiring strict proportionality
would presume that precise correlations between criminal offenses and deserved punish-
ments were discernable and acknowledged by policymakers throughout the nation. Such
a presumption is unrealistic given that local jurisdictions may disagree as to the severity
of particular offenses. The amount of leeway allowed for jurisdictional variations, how-
ever, must not be so great as to undermine the guarantee of proportionate sentencing. To
determine whether variations fall within constitutional parameters, reviewing courts usu-
ally question whether an extreme sentence is nothing "more than a different exercise of
legislative judgment." Id. at 381.
Courts have recognized that there may be a range of constitutionally permissible
[Vol. 58:455
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of proportionality review contend that there are no objective cri-
teria to guide courts in making a decision on whether a legisla-
tively mandated sentence is disproportionate to its crime.6 Thus,
it is argued that courts will be left to impose their subjective
views of whether a punishment is proportional to its
crime-leading to the accusation that courts are overstepping
their bounds by substituting their judgment for that of the legis-
lature. To meet these concerns, proponents of the proportional-
sentences for a given offense. In Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1983), the
court held that although a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a 21-year-old
heroin dealer was not well-proportioned to the crime, that did not mean it rose to a level
of unconstitutional disproportionality. Id. at 507. Justice Kennedy has underscored this
view by stating that one of the guiding principles in proportionality review is that the
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2705 (1991). Strict proportionality would not
allow for different theories of punishment or differing responses to local conditions and
would inhibit innovative legislative responses to societal problems. Id. See also Gilchrist,
supra note 2, at 1121 n.13 (explaining that strict proportionality is impracticable because
of the difficulty in determining the relative gravity of different offenses, the amount of
punishment deserved for each and the unacceptability of requiring persons to suffer the
punishment deserved in every case without regard to competing principles of social
utility).
8 See, e.g., Hon. William H. Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Pro-
portionality Rule, 47 FoRDHAis L REv. 639, 646 (1979)(requiring courts to make judg-
ments as to the seriousness of crimes for sentencing purposes invites the substitution of
the judiciarys subjective views for determinations of the legislature); Charles W.
Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of
William Rummel, 71 J. CRn. L. & CRMUNOLOGY 378, 417 (1980)(the inability of the judi-
ciary to make objective distinctions between different degrees of severity calls for a rejec-
tion of activist proportionality intervention by the courts).
The supposed lack of objective standards to guide courts has provided the basis for
the Supreme Court's refusal to endorse a broad guarantee of proportionate sentencing.
For instance, in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Court rejected the notion
that crimes involving violence could conclusively be regarded as more serious and thus
meriting harsher punishments than nonviolent crimes. Justice Rehnquist stated that-
Caesar's death at the hands of Brutus and his fellow conspirators was un-
doubtedly violent; the death of Hamlet's father at the hands of his brother,
Claudius, by poison, was not. Yet there are few, if any, States which do not
punish murder by poison (or attempted murder by poison) as they do murder
or attempted murder by stabbing.
Id. at 282 n.27. Similarly, Rehaquist argued that rational people could disagree on
whether embezzlement by a banking executive or robbery of a bank at gunpoint would
merit harsher punishment. Id.
Justice Scalia has also been a vocal critic of the notion that judges can objectively
discern standards of proportionality. Believing that the gravity of an offense depends
upon how socially threatening one believes an offense to be, Scalia states that the "real
function of a constitutional proportionality principle, if it exists, is to enable judges to
evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of men and women has considered proportion-
ate-and to say that it is not." Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2697.
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ity guarantee offer standards that purport to make proportional-
ity review a more objective undertaking. The most frequently
used standard constitutes a tripartite test that: (1) assesses the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the punishment; (2)
compares the challenged sentence to sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) compares the chal-
lenged sentence to sentences imposed for the commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions.7 Proportionality critics, how-
ever, are not persuaded that the first two prongs of the test suffi-
ciently minimize judicial subjectivity to make proportionality re-
view viable and they attack the third prong as violative of
federalism principles owing to its interjurisdictional comparison
of sentences.'
The United States Supreme Court has had great difficulty
in elaborating a proportionality doctrine that adequately ad-
dresses all concerns. The Court has vacillated between adher-
ence to a very narrow proportionality principle and adoption of
a broad standard of review. On the one hand, fears of judicial
subjectivity have compelled the Court to constrict the scope of
proportionality review to those rare instances where there would
be little disagreement as to the disproportionality of a particular
sentenceY On the other hand, the Court's faith in workable ob-
jective standards has allowed a greater scope of review.10 Conse-
quently, the Court has never clearly enunciated a proportional-
ity doctrine and, within the past decade, has been sending
contradictory signals to lower courts on the scope and proper
method of interpreting the doctrine.11
7 The earliest courts engaging in proportionality review recognized the usefulness of
these standards either individually or in conjunction with one another and the standards
gradually became more systemized. Justice Powell embraced this tripartite analysis in
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
8 By employing an analysis that uses the sentencing schemes of other jurisdictions
as a standard for comparison, critics charge that a state or locality is prohibited from
addressing peculiarly local problems with novel approaches. The use of the inter-jurisdic-
tional test is deemed inimical to the diversity cultivated in the federal system. The fed-
eralism argument rests on the notion that states retain a large degree of sovereignty to
shape their penal laws. When a court engages in an inter-jurisdictional comparison, it
impinges upon a state's sovereignty. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
' See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 263.
10 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 277.
11 Regardless of any claims of consistency, see Solem, 463 U.S. at 288 n.13, the
Court's contradictory signals are apparent when comparing Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.
Ct. 2680 (1991), Solem, 463 U.S. at 277, Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370, and Rummel, 445 U.S. at
[Vol. 58:455
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Within this unsettled framework Hector Gonzalez asked the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to review
the proportionality of his sentence. 12 After he was convicted of
tampering with a Drug Enforcement Agency informant and pre-
meditated first degree murder, Gonzalez was sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole. With respect to the proportional-
ity issue presented, United States v. Gonzalez': is not an un-
usual or terribly difficult case. Regardless of how the Supreme
Court may define its proportionality review, the Gonzalez deci-
sion was clearly correct: life imprisonment without possibility of
parole is not a disproportionate sentence for the crime of first
degree murder. While the result itself may be unremarkable, the
analysis employed by the Gonzalez court was significant. Disre-
garding the objective factors set forth by the Supreme Court in
Solem v. Helm,14 the Second Circuit stated that only where the
offense committed causes less revulsion than the punishment
imposed would a proportionality challenge be successful. Not
only does Gonzalez highlight the difficulty lower federal courts
have had in following admittedly inconsistent Supreme Court
doctrine,15 but it also signifies the federal judiciary's abandon-
ment of any meaningful proportionality guarantee.
This Comment will first provide an overview of the legal ori-
gins and judicial development of the proportionality doctrine in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Next it will examine the Second
Circuit's reasoning in Gonzalez. By substituting a subjective
"shock the conscience" standard of review for a more objective
approach, the Second Circuit severs proportionality review from
the few stable anchorings it once had. Additionally, the Supreme
Court's most recent visiting of the issue, in Harmelin v. Michi-
gan,16 has not offered an acceptable alternative to the tripartite
analysis. This Comment submits that Gonzalez followed too re-
strictive an approach to the proportionality analysis and urges
263.
1'2 United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 660
(1991).
13 922 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 660 (1991).
14 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
11 Gonzalez is only one of scores of cases that have struggled to interpret the Su-
preme Court's proportionality doctrine in light of Rummel and Solem. A survey of the
case law reveals how confusing proportionality review has become. See infra note 105
and accompanying text.
16 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
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that the Second Circuit broaden its proportionality review ac-
cordingly. The Solem tripartite test has led neither to an infu-
sion of subjective judicial views in proportionality review nor to
the overturning of legislative schemes. Ultimately, this Com-
ment advocates adherence to the Solem test.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE SU-
PREME COURT
Those who have challenged their sentences as unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate relied on the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause1" for a guarantee of pro-
portionate sentencing. Although on its face this clause does not
guarantee that sentences be proportioned to the offenses com-
mitted, English history provides some support for finding such a
guarantee. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized, at
various times and to various degrees, an Eighth Amendment
right to proportionate sentencing.' 8
" U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
18 There is a lively and inconclusive debate over the origins and meaning of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Tracing the text of the clause back to the En-
glish Declaration of Rights of 1689, historians have been unable to conclude whether the
English intended to prohibit only cruel and unusual methods of punishment or whether
the clause was aimed at disproportionate punishments as well. See Granucci, supra note
2, at 839 (arguing that in viewing the English Bill of Rights as prohibiting only barba-
rous modes of punishment, the Framers misinterpreted the intention of the English
drafters); Schwartz, supra note 6, at 382 (arguing that the "traditional view" of the
Eighth Amendment as prohibiting only cruel methods of punishment is valid); JUSTICE
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 750-51 (Da
Capo Press 1970) (1883) (The Eighth Amendment was "adopted, as an admonition to all
departments of the national government, to warn them against such violent proceedings,
as had taken place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts ... Enor-
mous fines and amercements were . . . sometimes imposed, and cruel and vindictive
punishments inflicted."). Not even the Eighth Amendment ratification debates have
yielded much insight into the problem since there was little debate on the amendment.
See I Annals of the Cong. 754 (J. Gales, ed. 1789)(complete debate). Nonetheless, the
Justices have expressed their views on the matter and bring them to bear in their opin-
ions. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 393 (1910)(White, J. dissent-
ing)(the English bill of rights contained no theory of proportional punishment); Solem,
463 U.S. at 286 (1983) (Justice Powell asserts that the Framers of the Eighth Amend-
ment adopted the principle of proportionality that was implicit in the English bill of
rights.). Most recently, Justice Scalia, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2687
(1991), argued that the English cruel and unusual punishments clause had nothing to do
with proportionate sentencing, but was meant to prohibit the illegal exercise of royal
power. Contrary to Justice Scalia's somewhat isolated view, this Comment presumes that
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does provide a guaran-
[Vol. 58: 455
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For the first hundred years of its existence, the Eighth
Amendment received scant attention from the Court, and the
prevailing view was that it prohibited only cruel and unusual
methods of punishment.19 The amendment's protection did not
extend to a guarantee of proportionate sentencing.20 In 1892, in
O'Neil v. Vermont,21 the proportionality element of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause was noticed in a dissenting
opinion. While the majority would not entertain O'Neil's claim
that his sentence was disproportionate, 5 Justice Field stated
tee against disproportionate punishment Moving from that point, the issue becomes how
broad a guarantee the Constitution encompasses and how that guarantee is most effec-
tively implemented by courts.
19 During this period, the Eighth Amendment was largely viewed as a prohibition
against torture and inhumane forms of punishment See supra note 18. It was thought to
be a safeguard against such heinous acts as the English practice of "drawing the con-
demned man on a cart to the gallows, where he was hanged by the neck, cut down while
still alive, disembowelled and his bowels burnt before him, and then beheaded and quar-
tered" and burning female felons at the stake. See Granucci, supra note 2, at 854; O'Neil
v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892). The brief presented by the government in Weems
reflected this view, arguing that the Eighth Amendment was concerned only with 'muti-
lations and degradations." 217 U.S. at 356. The Eighth Amendment was invoked at vari-
ous times to challenge methods of capital punishment. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130 (1878) (capital punishment by firing squad not cruel and unusual given that this was
a common mode of execution); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (although not a his-
torical punishment, the New York State legislature concluded that death by electrocu-
tion was more humane than death by hanging).
In addition, the era was marked by the federal judiciary's reluctance to intrude upon
what was believed to be the exclusive realm of state courts. Not until the extension of
other federal guarantees to the criminally accused and convicted by the Supreme Court
under Chief Justice Earl Warren was the Eighth Amendment expressly held applicable
to states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (invalidating a 90-day prison
sentence for the crime of being addicted to narcotics).
20 Although it was not yet considered to be within the purview of the Eighth
Amendment, the possibility of a proportionality guarantee was referred to on occasion.
For example, in Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 480 (1866), the Court
stated in dicta that if the Eighth Amendment had applied to state legislation, a $50 fine
and a term of three months at hard labor would "not be regarded as excessive, cruel, or
unusual" for the crime of maintaining a tenement for the sale of liquors vithout a li-
cense. 72 U.S. at 480. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, when reviewing a
25-year sentence imposed under a recidivist statute on a defendant convicted of perjury,
obtaining property by false pretenses and forgery, stated it was poW-sible "that imprison-
ment ... for a long term of years might be so disproportionate to the offense as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment." McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322,
328-29 (1899), aff'd, 180 U.S. 311 (1901).
21 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
2 Id. at 339-40.
O'Neil, a wholesale and retail dealer of wines and liquors in Whitehall, New York,
was in the practice of filling orders received from the citizens of Rutland, Vermont. Id. at
1992]
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that the Eighth Amendment was directed not only against bar-
barous modes of punishment, such as the rack, the thumbscrews
and the iron boot, "but against all punishments which by their
excessive length or severity [we]re greatly disproportioned to the
offences charged. 24
A. Weems v. United States
In 1910 the Supreme Court decided what is often regarded
as the seminal proportionality doctrine case. In Weems v.
United States25 the Court enlarged the scope of the Eighth
Amendment to incorporate Justice Field's view that the Consti-
tution guaranteed proportionate sentencing. Under this ap-
proach, the Court held that a fifteen-year prison term of
"cadena temporal" was unconstitutionally disproportionate for
the offense of falsifying a public document.26 While recognizing
327. The thirsty Vermonters would often send their empty jugs to O'Neil via the Na-
tional Express Company with a note attached requesting that the containers be filled, Id.
O'Neil would honor these requests and send the filled jugs back to Rutland to be deliv-
ered C.O.D. Subsequently, a Rutland jury convicted O'Neil of 307 violations "of selling
intoxicating liquor without authority and contrary to the laws of Vermont." Id. See Re-
vised Laws of Vermont, ch. 169, §§ 3800, 3802 (1880). He was fined $6638.72, $20 for
each offense plus prosecution costs. If he did not pay before a specified date, he was to
be confined to hard labor for 19,914 days (over 54 years). See Revised Laws of Vermont,
§ 4366 (1880) (prescribing the time of imprisonment for default of fines payment).
The majority found that the claim of cruel and unusual punishment was not as-
signed as error in the brief to the Court and, furthermore, that the Eighth Amendment
did not apply to the states. Id. at 331-32. Justice Field, however, was not content with
the majority's resolution of the case. He stated that "[i]f there is no remedy ... there is a
defect in our laws .... I think there is a remedy, and that it should be afforded by this
court." Id. at 341.
24 Id. at 339-40. Even before the proportionality principle was officially recognized,
Justice Field was engaging in a comparative analysis to other crimes and sentences. He
noted that if O'Neil had been convicted of burglary, highway robbery, manslaughter,
forgery or perjury he would have received a lesser punishment. Id. at 339. This demon-
strates the tendency to resort to a comparative analysis to make an informed objective
decision on the proportionality of a sentence.
25 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
26 Owing to the historical fact of the Spanish cession of the Philippine Islands to the
United States after the Spanish-American War, the Weems Court found itself interpret-
ing a provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights that was nearly identical to the Eighth
Amendment. The interpretation of the Philippine clause was therefore deemed to be a
pronouncement of the meaning of its American counterpart.
Weems, a government disbursing officer who falsified an entry in a cashbook, was
sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a punishment borrowed from the penal code
of Spain. The Court described Weems' punishment as "confinement in a penal institu-
tion [with] a chain at the ankle and wrist ... hard and painful labor, no assistance from
[Vol. 58: 455
PROPORTIONALITY IN SENTENCING
the "wide range of power that the legislature possesses"' , in de-
fining crimes and fixing punishments, the Court asserted that it
was "a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to [the] offense. "28 To illustrate the
disproportionate relationship between Weems's punishment and
offense, the Court compared his crime to more serious crimes
that had more lenient penalties and also to the comparable fed-
eral offense of falsifying public documents, which would have
merited, at most, two years imprisonment. 9 Essentially Weems
carved out a broad proportionality guarantee from the Cruel and
Unusual'Punishments Clause by tempering its respect for the
legislative prerogative in defining punishments. The Court did
so through a comparative analysis that assessed whether the leg-
islature had exceeded its constitutional authority.30
friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property...." Id.
at 366. In addition to these conditions of confinement, Weems would endure "accesso-
ries" to his punishment after his release. These consisted of civil interdiction, perpetual
absolute disqualification and subjection to surveillance for the remainder of his life. Id.
at 364. Holding this sentence to be unconstitutional, the Court stated that such punish-
ment for such a crime "excit[ed] wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate
adaptation of punishment to the degree of crime." Id. at 365.
27 Id. at 379.
118 Id. at 367.
2 Id. at 380-81. The terse comparison that was done in the O'Neil dissent took on
greater analytical proportion in Weems. Closely paralleling the tripartite test, which
would be enunciated years later, the Court: (1).evaluated the nature of Weems's offense
and punishment, finding that he had falsified a single item of a public record, had in-
jured no one and had no intent to defraud, but was nonetheless subjected to a severe
punishment imposed with "draconian uniformity"; (2) listed several crimes, including
various degrees of homicide, inciting rebellion, robbery and larceny, all of which the
Court believed to be more serious than Weems's offense, yet they merited more lenient
punishment; and (3) compared Weems's offense and sentence to the identical crime in
the United States and found that an offender in the United States could not be impris-
oned for more than two years.
20 This expansive interpretation of Weems is not the only possible reading of the
case. In the Court's most recent opinion interpreting the contours of the proportionality
principle, Justice Scalia forthrightly asserts that Weems is susceptible of divergent read-
ings. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2699 (1991). Since the Weems Court con-
demned the punishments "both on account of their degree and kind," 217 U.S. at 377
(emphasis added), a question arises whether the opinion can be read as an endorsement
of a broad proportionality guarantee alone or whether the holding was inextricably tied
to the peculiar accessories also imposed as part of the punishment. Justice Scalia sup-
ports his view that Weems did not announce a general proportionality principle by not-
ing the long period of dormancy after Weems during which no proportionality guarantee
was invoked. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2700.
This Comment argues, however, that the most crucial portion of the Weems deci-
sion, which Justice Scalia overlooks, directs that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
1992]
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B. The Rummel v. Estelle and Solem v. Helm Decisions
Seventy years after Weems the Supreme Court had the op-
portunity to apply the proportionality principle to another sen-
tence for a term of years.3 1 Unlike Weems, the decision in Rum-
mel v. Estelle2 adopted a restrictive approach to proportionality
review. The Court held that a mandatory life term with a possi-
bility of parole was not a disproportionate punishment for a
third-felony offender convicted under a Texas recidivist stat-
ute.3 Rummel's life sentence for three nonviolent, property-re-
lated offenses 3 underlined how narrow the proportionality prin-
ciple had suddenly become. In addition to construing Weems as
based more upon the peculiarity of the sentence than its exces-
sive length, the Court reasoned that since courts were incapable
of making objective determinations regarding the severity of
Clause be interpreted liberally. The Weems Court devoted several pages to an exposition
of the necessity of reading the Constitution broadly, instructing that "a principle to be
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."
Weems, 217 U.S. at 373. The Court suggested that the Framers of the Eighth Amend-
ment had sufficient insight to foresee that cruel and unusual punishment could be in-
flicted in ways "other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation," and that
they therefore intended the clause to apply to other abusive practices as they arose in
the future. Id. at 372. Following the express language set forth by the Court, it is unmis-
takable that the clause is to be interpreted to encompass "new conditions and purposes,"
such as the guarantee of proportionate sentencing. Id. at 373. The earliest commentary
on Weems stated that "the progressive construction of [the Cruel and Unusual Punish.
ments Clause] laid down by this case [Weems] seems desirable." Note, What is Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARv. L. Ray. 54, 55 (1911) [hereinafter What is Cruel].
This reading of the clause is also supported by the Court's continued recognition of the
Eighth Amendment's dynamic nature. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)(The
Eighth Amendment "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.").
31 Although this Comment is concerned only with the proportionality principle as it
applies to sentences for terms of years, proportionality challenges do arise in other con-
texts. For instance, the Court's death penalty jurisprudence often involves questions of
proportionate sentencing. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that capital
punishment is a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty is unconstitutional when imposed for felony murder
where defendant was but a mere participant in the felony).
32 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
33 Id. at 285.
In 1964 William Rummel pleaded guilty to a charge of fraudulent use of a credit
card to obtain $80 worth of goods and services. In 1969 Rummel pleaded guilty to pass-
ing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. In 1973 Rummel was convicted of obtaining
$120.75 by false pretenses. It was upon this third conviction that the state sought to




crimes and corresponding punishments, only in very rare and ex-
treme cases could a sentence be overturned as unconstitutionally
disproportionate.3 5
The dissent, in challenging the majority's narrow view of
the proportionality principle, reasoned that Weems had spelled
out a broad proportionality guarantee. The dissent offered three
objective factors that judges could rely upon to review the pro-
portionality of sentences.36 Reviewing courts were: (1) to ex-
3' The majority emphasized that Rummel, demonstrating himself to be incorrigible,
was punished not solely for his specific offenses, but for his status as a habitual offender.
He was therefore deserving of a harsh punishment. Id. at 276. In contrast the dissent
focused on the petty nature of the underlying offenses.
Recidivist statutes raise troublesome proportionality questions when the punish-
ment seems too severe in relation to the underlying offensive conduct. See, e.g., Graham
v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (mandatory life sentence for three horse stealing
convictions constitutional). Unlike the Texas recidivist statute at issue in Rummel, the
current Federal Sentencing Guidelines Career Offender provision, see Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (Nov. 1990), metes out harsher penalties only when the
instant offense and the two prior convictions are either crimes of violence or controlled
substance offenses. This formulation insures that a repent offender with comparatively
minor underlying convictions will receive different consideration than more serious of-
fenders. Repeat offenders of federal drug laws who are sentenced under this provision,
however, frequently challenge the proportionality of their sentences, contending that
their drug offenses are not grave crimes. See, e.g., United States v. McLean, 951 F.2d
1300 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (seventeen and one-half year sentence for a "career offender" not
disproportionate); United States v. Gordon, 953 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant
had at least two previous convictions for controlled substance felonies and sentence of
262 months was therefore not disproportionate); United States v. Willis, 956 F.2d 248
(11th Cir. 1992) (life sentence for third and fourth drug offense convictions permissible).
It is important to recognize that the Rummel Court did not hold that there was no
proportionality principle in constitutional review. Rather, in what proved to be the most
critical part of the decision, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in a footnote the dissent's
hypothetical of overtime parking punishable by life imprisonment, noting that "Ithis
[was] not to say that a proportionality principle would not come into play in the extreme
example mentioned by the dissent." Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11; see also supra note 1.
This slight opening allowed the Solem Court to broaden the guarantee just three years
later.
36 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting). These criteria dated back to
Weems and were being used by lower federal courts long before they were mentioned in
this dissenting opinion. Justice Powell, who wrote for the dissent, indicated that these
criteria were a way to "minimize the risk of constitutionalizing the personal predilections
of federal judges." Id.
Critical of proportionality review, the majority was quick to reject the idea that an
objective analysis could be performed. It believed that any ordering of crimes on a con-
tinuum was purely subjective and that it was impossible for a court to conclude, for
instance, that a first time violent offender necessarily warranted harsher punishment
than a three-time nonviolent offender. The Court stated that "rational people could disa-
gree as to which criminal merits harsher punishment." Id. at 282 n.27. See also supra
note 6 and accompanying text. This argument was aimed at undercutting the first two
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amine the nature of the offense and the accompanying sentence;
(2) to perform an intra-jurisdictional comparison of the defend-
ant's sentence to those imposed for other crimes in that jurisdic-
tion; and finally (3) to perform an inter-jurisdictional compari-
son by looking at sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions. After applying this three-part analysis, the dissent
concluded that Rummel's sentence was disproportionate to the
offenses he committed.
3 7
In 1983, three years after the Rummel decision, the Court
appeared to reverse itself in Solem v. Helm.s5 The Court found a
prongs of the dissent's analysis which relied upon some determination of the relative
gravity of offenses. Furthermore, after reviewing the charts and tables Rummel submit-
ted to show that he received the harshest penalty of any jurisdiction in the nation, the
majority stated that there was no "constitutionally imposed uniformity" of sentencing
and that some state would inevitably have the harshest penalty for a crime. Id. at 279-
82. Thus the federalism argument was utilized to undercut the third prong of the dis-
sent's analysis. See supra notes 5 & 8 and accompanying text.
3 Specifically, Justice Powell concluded that the nature of Rummel's crimes was
nonviolent and nonthreatening, causing physical injury to no one; Texas's recidivist stat.
ute did not differentiate between types of habitual offenders, making it possible for a
defendant who committed three murders to be sentenced identically to a defendant who
cashed three fraudulent checks; and Rummel would not have been sentenced to a
mandatory life term for three nonviolent property-related offenses in any other jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 295-302.
- 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Between the Rummel and Solem decisions the Supreme
Court decided a case that sharpened the Court's position on the proportionality princi.
ple. Convicted of possession of nine ounces of marijuana with intent to distribute, Tren-
ton Davis was sentenced to 40 years in prison and given a $20,000 fine under a Virginia
statute. Tracing the course of Davis's appeal demonstrates the disarray in proportional.
ity review that has resulted from a lack of consensus on how broad the guarantee is or
should be.
Using an objective analysis formulated by the Fourth Circuit in Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974), see infra note 101 and accom-
panying text, which consisted of essentially the same criteria cited in the Rummel dis-
sent, the district court ruled Davis's sentence to be unconstitutionally disproportionate.
David v. Zahrandnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977). A Fourth Circuit panel deci-
sion, retreating from the Hart analysis and stating that Weems was based more on the
method than the length of punishment, concluded that the 40 year sentence was within
constitutional bounds. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978). On rehearing en
banc, the court affirmed the district court's finding of unconstitutionality based on the
lower court's analysis. Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court
vacated the en banc judgment, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), and remanded it for further consid-
eration in light of Rummel. By an equally divided court, the Fourth Circuit again af-
firmed the district court's ruling. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981).
The Supreme Court, irritated by the Fourth Circuit's apparent disregard of control-
ling precedent, wrote the last word on Davis's proportionality challenge. In Hutto v. Da-
vis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), the Court held in a per curiam opinion that the 40 year sentence
was not disproportionate and therefore did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
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sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole to be
unconstitutionally disproportionate when imposed on a seven-
time nonviolent felony offender.39 Instead of following the nar-
row course for proportionality review set forth in Rummel, the
Solem Court boldly asserted that "as a matter of principle... a
criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which
the defendant has been convicted. 4 0 Cognizant of the fact that
appellate courts were not to substitute their judgments for those
of sentencing courts and legislatures, the Court applied the
Rummel dissent's three-prong analysis. The Court found that
while Helm's offenses were relatively minor, his punishment was
the most severe that could be implemented in South Dakota.41 It
also found that the few crimes punishable by life imprisonment
in South Dakota were quite grave in comparison to Helm's of-
fenses. 42 Finally, it found that Helm "was treated more severely
than he would have been in any other State.' 343 The Court, satis-
While the Rummel court had pointed out the difficulties inherent in a supposedly objec-
tive analysis, Hutto explicitly rejected each element of the Fourth Circuit's Hart test,
finding that they could not justify an extensive proportionality review by courts. Id.. at
373-74 n.2. In restating the holding of Rummel, the Hutto Court left little doubt about
the restricted scope of the proportionality guarantee: "Rummel stands for the proposi-
tion that federal courts should be 'reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment,' and that 'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare'." Id. at 374 (citations omitted). Once again, how-
ever, the Court did not close the door entirely on proportionality review, as it reiterated
the possibility that the principle would be applicable in the "overtime parking" scenario.
Id. at 374 n.3.
" The factual similarity between the Rummel and Salem cases makes the differing
judgments difficult to explain. Similar to Rummel, Jerry Helm's offenses were nonviolent
and many were property-related. Over a span of 15 years, Helm had been convicted of
obtaining money under false pretenses, third-offense driving while intoxicated, uttering a
"no account" check for $100 and three offenses of third-degree burglary. 463 US. at 279-
80. The fact that Helm had seven prior convictions compared to Rummel's three prior
convictions only adds to the difficulty in distinguishing the outcomes. Also similar to
Rummel, Helm was prosecuted under a recidivist statute imposing a mandatory term of
life imprisonment.
40 463 U.S. at 290.
11 Id. at 297. Striving to maintain some semblance of consistency, the Court distin-
guished Rummel by noting that under Texas's generous good time credit system, Rum-
mel could theoretically be paroled in 12 years, while Helm had no possibility of parole.
Id.
42 Id. at 298. The Court listed treason, first-degree manslaughter, first-degree arson
and kidnapping. In the Court's view, these were all much more serious offenses than any
of those committed by Helm, yet they all received the same punishment.
43 Id. at 300. The analysis conducted by the court of appeals revealed that Nevada
was the only state in which Helm might have been given a similar sentence, but that
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fled that its decision was based on an objective analysis, con-
cluded that Helm's sentence was unconstitutionally
disproportionate.
C. Harmelin v. Michigan
The inconsistent Rummel and Solem rulings left the pro-
portionality doctrine in need of clarification. Because Solem pro-
fessed not to overrule Rummel, lower courts were unsure of the
scope of proportionality review and the degree of deference to be
accorded legislative decisions. In 1991, in Harmelin v. Michi-
gan,44 the Court attempted to reconcile the tension between
Rummel and Solem, but instead added to the proportionality
doctrine's ambiguities. The Court was presented with the diffi-
cult issue of whether a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole was disproportionate to the offense of pos-
session of 672.5 grams of cocaine. In holding that the sentence
was not disproportionate, the Court was divided on which ap-
proach to adopt.45
Justice Scalia, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took
the novel position that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Un-
usual Punishments Clause contained no guarantee of propor-
tionate sentencing.4" Convinced both that history showed no
such guarantee and that judges could not draw objective lines
between constitutionally permissible and impermissible
sentences for terms of years, Scalia stated that he would simply
overrule Solem,47 declining to review the sentence in this or any
such a sentence was only authorized, not mandated, by Nevada law. Id. at 299-300.
4 111. S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
" The Court was split 5-4 as to whether Harmelin's sentence was constitutional.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Ken-
nedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, filed a concurring opinion. Justice White
wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Although agreeing
with Justice White, Justice Marshall filed a separate dissenting opinion simply to note
his belief that capital punishment is in all instances unconstitutional under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.
40 Id. at 2686.
'7 Id. Justice Scalia harbored no hope that a workable objective analysis could be
implemented. He stated that:
The real function of a constitutional proportionality principle, if it exists, is to
enable judges to evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of men and women
has considered proportionate-and to say that it is not. For the real-world en-
terprise, the standards seem so inadequate that the proportionality principle




Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, attempted, like many
lower courts, to reconcile Rummel with Solem. He concluded
that the Court's decisions had always recognized a "narrow"
proportionality principle,48 as in Rummel, but that the compara-
tive analysis of Sotem was to be retained and utilized only after
a threshold comparison had led to an inference that the sentence
was grossly disproportionate. 9 Kennedy also gleaned from case
law what he determined as the five essential principles of pro-
portionality review. He stated that: (1) the legislature holds a
position of primacy in establishing prison terms for crimes; (2)
the Eighth Amendment does not dictate adherence to any one
penological theory; (3) federalism promotes differing penal
schemes; (4) proportionality review must be as objective as pos-
sible; and (5) the Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence."" Concluding that
Harmelin's conduct posed a grave threat to society,5 1 Kennedy
found that it was not unreasonable for the Michigan legislature
to impose such a harsh sentence.
Justice White's dissent castigated both Scalia and Kennedy
for not respecting the proportionality doctrine.5 2 White insisted
that Solem was the controlling case and he proceeded to find the
sentence imposed upon Harmelin unconstitutionally dispro-
portionate.5"
Id. at 2697.
48 Id. at 2702.
" Id. at 2707.
60 Id. at 2703-05.
"I Id. at 2705.
12 Id. at 2709.
53 Id. at 2716-19. Applying the Solem analysis, Justice Vhite found that Harmelin's
crime of mere possession was nonviolent and the crime required a degree of intent not
indicative of a grave offense. Yet the sentence for the crime was the most stringent im-
posed for any crime in Michigan. Harmelin received a sentence more severe than those
given to criminals who committed crimes against persons and property. Only Alabama
imposed such a harsh penalty for first-time drug offenders; however Alabama required
the possession of at least 10 kilograms of cocaine, compared to only 650 grams required
under the Michigan statute. Although the Supreme Court found the sentence in Harme-
lin not to be constitutionally excessive, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in People v.
Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992), subsequently held that the Michigan sentencing
scheme did violate that state's constitutional prohibition against "cruel or unusual pun-
ishment." In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Michigan focused on the fact
that the Michigan provision was worded differently from the Eighth Amendment, that
the ichigan provision was adopted more than 171 years after the Eighth Amendment
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II. THE GONZALEZ DECISION
In August 1989 twenty-one-year-old Hector Gonzalez, an in-
dividual involved in drug trafficking on Manhattan's Lower East
Side, killed Felix Pichardo, a confidential informant, to prevent
him from giving information on narcotics activities to the Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") 4 The evidence introduced at
trial indicated that Gonzalez had committed premeditated
murder.
A jury sitting in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York subsequently convicted Gonzalez
of both tampering with an informant and first degree murder
Under the federal homicide statute and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole.56 Gonzalez challenged his sentence as a violation
of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment. He argued that his sentence was unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate to the offense he committed.
The Second Circuit decided Gonzalez's case in January
1991, six months before the Harmelin decision. The Gonzalez
court thus had to resolve the conflicting holdings of Rummel
and Solem by itself. In an analysis that echoed the Rummel
holding, the Second Circuit held that Gonzalez's sentence was
constitutional, unanimously reasoning that the Supreme Court
had intended there to be only a narrow proportionality guaran-
tee.57 While describing its scope of review in minimalist terms,
the court emphasized the superior role of the legislature in de-
termining penological schemes, noting that the "legislature's line
drawing ... is primary and presumptively valid." 8 When, in' a
"rare case,"59 a court engages in proportionality review, the
court stated that it was "confined to deciding whether a sen-
tence .. . [was] .within constitutional limits."60 Only if a chal-
and that Michigan precedent interpreting the state's prohibition "was more consistent
with the reasoning of the Harmelin dissenters than with that of the Harmelin majority."
Id. at 873.
United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1991).
55 Id. at 1048.
86 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b), 3559, 3581 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).






lenged punishment "shocked the collective conscience of soci-
ety""1 would it be ruled unconstitutionally disproportionate. A
sentence of life imprisonment without parole for premeditated
murder was not deemed to be "shocking" to society's conscience.
The Second Circuit made no mention of the Solem tripartite
test. 2
III. ANALYSIS
Neither Gonzalez nor Harmelin bodes well for defendants
who challenge their sentences on proportionality grounds. These
cases have so narrowed the proportionality guarantee that to be
successful the challenged sentence would have to rise to a level
of absurdity-a sentence of life imprisonment for overtime park-
ing. This disturbing trend of undue deference to the legislature
in fixing punishments is an abdication of the responsibility im-
posed on courts by the Eighth Amendment.0 3 An individual's
freedom from disproportionate punishment is in serious jeop-
61 Id. Alternatively, the court framed its test for disproportionality as whether the
offense causes less revulsion than the punishment imposed. If the offense is found to be
less revolting than the punishment, the punishment would be held unconstitutionally
disproportionate. Id.
62 Though the court's proportionality discussion did lean toward the restrictive
Rummel holding, the court did not ignore the Solem decision. The court compared the
facts and holdings of Rummel and Salem, id. at 1052, and noted that they were "difficult
to harmonize." Id. The court utilized language from Solem that was deferential to legis-
lative determinations and that could be dovetailed easily with Rummel's holding in
grasping for a coherent doctrine.
83 Dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir.
1978), Justice Marshall stated:
It is axiomatic that this Court should approach Eighth Amendment challenges
with caution, lest it become "under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility.
. throughout the country." But neither should the Court abdicate the function
conferred by the Eighth Amendment, to determine whether application of a
given legislative judgment results in punishment grossly out of proportion to
specific offenses. I decline to join the Court in its abdication here.
439 U.S. 1091, 1102 (1979). In Carmona appellants challenged the constitutionality of
their mandatory indeterminate life sentences for the sale of one individual dose of co-
caine and the possession of three and three-eighths ounces of cocaine. The district court,
noting that the legislative power to define crimes and establish punishments was subject
to judicial scrutiny, 436 F. Supp. 1153, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), found the sentence uncon-
stitutionally disproportionate. The Second Circuit reversed. When appellants' Eighth
Amendment challenge was denied by the circuit court, one of the dissenting judges
stated: "I recognize fully, of course, the deference that must be paid to legislative deter-
minations of sentence. Such deference is not unlimited, however. Otherwise, the Eighth
Amendment would be the deadest of letters." 576 F.2d at 424.
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ardy if such a "hands off" attitude is taken by courts. In addi-
tion, this "hands off" approach cannot be justified by fears of
judicial subjectivity. Such fears need not be an impediment to
meaningful judicial review of sentences when a workable objec-
tive comparative analysis is available.
A. The Important Role of Proportionality
The important function the proportionality principle plays
in criminal jurisprudence should give courts reason to pause
before stripping the doctrine of its value. It is a precept of fair-
ness and justice that greater crimes should merit harsher penal-
ties than lesser crimes.0 4 The notion that punishment should be
proportional to the seriousness of the offense is fundamental to
maintaining an identity between the criminal law and the pub-
lic's general sense of morality. In this way, proportionate sen-
tencing serves the purpose of instilling respect for penal law. A
penal system that imposes severe punishments for minor crimes
runs the risk of being discredited and ridiculed."'
See supra note 2 (discussing proportionality as an inherently retributive concept);
see also Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976)(imposition of greater punish-
ment for lesser included offense than is imposed for the greater offense is unconstitution-
ally disproportionate).
Various criminal codes cite proportionate sentencing as an objective to be achieved.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (setting forth as goals to differentiate on reasonable
grounds between serious and minor offenses and to safeguard offenders against excessive,
disproportionate or arbitrary punishment); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 1988)("To
differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe
proportionate penalties therefore"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1)(West 1985 & Supp.
1992)(Punishment is "best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the
offense.")
65 H.L.A. Hart expresses the concern that where the legal gradation of crimes di-
verges from a "commonsense scale of gravity," there is a risk of confusing common mo-
rality or bringing the law into contempt. HART, supra note 2, at 25. Thus, disproportion-
ate sentencing leads people to question their generally held beliefs as to what are serious
and what are minor offenses. See also N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. XVII, § 1 ("[W]here the
same undistinguishing severity is exacted against all offenses the people are led to forget
the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as
little compunction as they do those of the lightest dye."); A.C. Ewing, A Study of Pun-
ishment II: Punishment as Viewed by the Philosopher, 21 CANADIAN B. REV. 102, 115
(1943)("To punish a lesser crime more severely than a greater would be either to suggest
to men's minds that the former was worse when it was not, or, if they could not accept
this, to bring the penal law in some degree into discredit or ridicule."). Ewing also sug-
gests that unnecessarily harsh penalties can make the criminal appear to be the victim of
cruel laws and thus detract attention from the criminal act and focus attention on the
cruelty of the punishment. Id. The stringent sentences imposed under the Federal Sen.
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As an element of the Eighth Amendment, the proportional-
ity guarantee also aids in defining the relationship between soci-
ety and its offending members.66 The Eighth Amendment de-
mands that states treat convicted individuals "with respect for
their intrinsic worth as human beings.""7 The requirement of
proportionate sentencing correspondingly restrains the use of
legislative power when it is utilized for extreme utilitarian pur-
poses.6 " Thus a sentence of life imprisonment for third-offense
tencing Guidelines and similar state statutes for relatively minor drug offenses have led
to a public outcry that sentences are too harsh, as evidenced by the formation of such
groups as Families Against Mandatory Minimums ("FAMM"). See Phil Donahue (NBC
television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1992).
" See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910)("Such penalties for such
offenses amaze those who have formed their conception of the relation of a state to even
its'offending citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths... "). See also
supra note 4; In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 923 (Cal. 1972) ("By observing this cautious,
often burdensome and sometimes unpopular procedure, the courts can often prevent the
will of the majority from unfairly interfering with the rights of individuals who ... may
be unable to protect themselves through the political process."); Carmona v. Ward, 436
F. Supp. 1153, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Proportionate sentencing protects individuals from
"unduly harsh, oppressive, or arbitrary punishments decreed by a majoritarian political
system."), rev'd, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 1091 (1979).
" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972)(Brennan, J., concurring).
", Philosopher Jeremy Bentham noted the propensity of those vested with power to
disregard the dignity of the individual An error [in imposing too severe a penalty] is
that to which legislators and men in general are naturally inclined: antipathy, or want of
compassion for individuals who are represented as dangerous and vile, pushes them on-
ward to an undue severity. It is on this side ... that we should take the most precau-
tions. Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 J. BE'mHAm4's WoR-s 399 (J.
Bowring ed., 1843).
Indeed, the congressional debate surrounding the adoption of the Bill of Rights fo-
cused on the question of how much limitation to place on the exercise of legislative
power. Some convention participants "felt sure that the spirit of liberty could be trusted,
and that its ideas would be represented, not debased, by legislation." Weems, 217 US. at
372. Patrick Henry, however, "would take no chances. [His] predominant political im-
pulse was distrust of power, and [he] insisted on constitutional limitations against its
abuse." Id. A principal motivation behind the adoption of the Eighth Amendment was
the belief "that power might be tempted to cruelty." Id. at 373. See also Bellavia v.
Fogg, 613 F.2d 369, 376 (2d Cir. 1979)(Mansfield, J., dissenting)("the Founding Fathers
did not vest our legislators with untrammeled discretion to prescribe punishment").
The critical view expressed by Bentham and Henry seems particularly applicable to
the contemporary legislative response to the illegal drug trade and drug use. In lieu of
more education and drug treatment, legislators are quick to condemn and impose ex-
tremely harsh sentences. It is not surprising that many of the most difficult proportional-
ity cases involve drug offenses. Drug offenders routinely invoke the proportionality guar-
antee as a safeguard against supposed legislative excesses. See, e.g., United States v.
Ortiz, 742 F.2d 712 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075 (1984); People v. Broadie, 37
N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 1091 (1979); Bellavia v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
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illegal parking designed to deter the public from engaging in
such conduct would be an unconstitutional exercise of the legis-
lature's power to prescribe punishment.
69
As the scope of proportionality review has become more re-
stricted, courts have become more silent about the importance
of the guarantee as a check on legislative powerY By adhering
to the overly deferential "shock the conscience" standard of re-
view which weakens the proportionality guarantee, Gonzalez has
undervalued the functions served by the proportionality
principle.
B. The Separation of Powers Dilemma: Overly Deferential to
the Legislature
As the Weems Court recognized, proportionality review in-
herently involves a clash between legislative and judicial powers.
To have a meaningful and consistently applied proportionality
guarantee, courts must mark the line that separates the proper
degree of deference to the legislature from the proper degree of
scrutiny used in reviewing legislative decisions. Although this
line is difficult to draw, there is wide agreement on general prin-
ciples.71 There is virtually no dispute that legislatures hold the
1979); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
See also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 427 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Un-
fortunately, grave evils such as the narcotics traffic can too easily cause threats to our
basic liberties by making attractive the adoption of constitutionally forbidden shortcuts
that might suppress and blot out more quickly the unpopular and dangerous con-
duct.")(cited in Justice White's Harmelin dissent).
69 In Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1988), see infra note 109, the
Fifth Circuit, unwilling to interfere with the goals of the Louisiana legislature, upheld a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a 21-year-old drug addict who was a
third-time drug offender. With no lack of sympathy, the court stated that "[i]n this in-
stance, the tiger trap has sprung on a sick kitten; and the point that Louisiana doubtless
wishes to make by punishing drug dealers in a signal manner finds a pathetic exemplar
in the hapless Terrebonne." Id. at 505. Nonetheless, the court could not "[tamper] with
Louisiana's attempts to bring its critical narcotics problem under control." Id.
'0 Discussions of the importance of proportionality review as a check on legislative
power figure prominently in decisions which hold challenged sentences to be unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate. See supra note 66. Conversely, such discussions are noticeably
lacking in decisions which have curbed the scope of the review. See, eg., Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
7 In his concurring opinion in Harmelin, Justice Kennedy set forth general princi-
ples that have guided proportionality review. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2705 (Kennedy, J.
concurring); see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. The cases are replete with
such broad statements and, although they serve as good starting points, they add little to
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power to define crimes and prescribe punishments, that courts
are not to second-guess the wisdom of these legislative decisions
or that the courts have the duty to strike down sentences which
are unconstitutionally excessive. 2 Once these safe generalities
are cleared away, however, disagreements quickly arise in defin-
ing what is "constitutionally excessive."
No matter where courts draw the line, most register at least
a perfunctory amount of deference by noting their subordinate
position to legislatures. Even cases that have allowed courts a
broad scope of review, such as Solem, never fail to note legisla-
tures' primary role in establishing penal policy.73 Other cases,
however, take the deferential stand much further, resulting in a
"hands off" approach to sentencing reviews. Judge Thornberry,
dissenting from the Fifth Circuit decision that found William
Rummel's life term sentence for three property-related offenses
unconstitutionally disproportionate, stated:
Perhaps, if I were a prosecutor, I would not have sought an indict-
ment charging the defendant with an habitual count; if I were a state
lawmaker I would vote to amend the statute so that it would not be
applied as has been done here; or if I were governor... I would con-
sider the petitioner a prime candidate for clemency. But I do not hold
these offices and my decision must be guided by the eighth amend-
ment rather than my feelings of compassion and justice."
Some courts buttress their deference to legislatures by empha-
sizing their institutional incompetence to make legislative types
of policy decisions. For instance, in reaching its decision in Gon-
zalez, the Second Circuit considered the legislature's line draw-
ing to be presumptively valid since a legislative body can "con-
an understanding of the scope of the proportionality guarantee. For instance, the Gonza-
lez court offered no insight into its position on proportionality review by stating "appel-
late examination is confined to deciding whether a sentence reviewed is within constitu-
tional limits." Gonzalez, 922 F.2d at 1053.
712 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, who do not think a sentence can be
unconstitutionally excessive, would disagree with the assertion that courts have a duty to
strike down unconstitutionally excessive sentences.
11 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). The boilerplate language proceeds thus:
"Reviewing courts... should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that
legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes . . . ." Id. See also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 377 (1982)(Powell, J.,
concurring).




duct hearings, take surveys, and hear a broad range of public
opinion in determining what is appropriate punishment. ' ' 7
Yet this legislative deference by courts fails to take into ac-
count that the political arena may give inadequate weight to the
rights of individuals.76 Judge Thornberry might believe that
were he a prosecutor, legislator or governor he would act to miti-
gate the harshness of the mandatory sentence there at issue, but
if he held one of these offices, he might be under greater political
pressure to support harsh and disproportionate sentences for the
greater good of his constituency. Instead of viewing the isolated
position held by judges as an impediment to proportionality re-
view, their position should be seen as allowing them to rein in
the excesses of the political branches. The Gonzalez court may
7. 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500,
506-07 (5th Cir. 1988)("We may be competent to contemplate outrageous disproportion
and declare that it cannot be; certainly, however, we are not equipped, nor do our proce-
dures lend themselves to equipping us, with the factual knowledge and common sense of
what is proportional [and] what punishments should be administered for particular of-
fenses .... ).
Taking the position that courts have neither the resources nor expertise to make
inherently legislative decisions, William Hughes Mulligan, former Judge for the Second
Circuit states:
I believe that state legislatures usually do not act aberrantly and are normally
responsive to and reflect community standards. Unlike federal judges who
serve for life, the legislator must answer to his constituency after relatively
brief terms of office. The deference we must pay the legislative determination
is due not only to constitutional concepts of separation of powers and federal-
ism, but also because of the institutional difficulty of the judiciary making the
social, moral, and penological decisions inherent [in proportionality review].
Mulligan, supra note 6, at 649.
7" Those who place great faith in the political process often forget that not all citi-
zens enjoy equal participation in government. One commentator seeks to remind readers
of this important reason for placing limits on legislative authority:
[There is a] suggestion that interpretation of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights ought to be exclusively committed to the "political process." This
formula contains almost too much irony to be taken wholly seriously. Those
who need the Bill of Rights need it because they cannot prevail in the "politi-
cal process".... Those who wrote these guarantees into the Constitution must
have known this; what other conceivable reason is there for placing constitu-
tional prohibitions on Congress . . . . [I]n virtually all cases the interest
shielded is a minority interest, and often one that is intensely unpopular.
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR. THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 103-04 (1960). See also United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)(Notwithstanding a rising tide
of judicial acquiescence in state economic regulation, Justice Stone noted in this famous
footnote that greater judicial scrutiny may be warranted where "prejudice against dis-




be correct that legislators have many tools to aid them in mak-
ing informed decisions that are not available to courts, but this,
of course, does not mean that legislative results will necessarily
comport with the requirements of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause. That is a determination to be made by the ju-
diciary.77 At least one commentator answers the separation of
powers dilemma by counseling less deference to legislators and
greater protection of individual rights:
Courts face a choice ... between impinging on the sovereignty of local
legislative decisionmaking or on an individual's constitutional right to
protection from excessive punishment. Since a finding of invalidity
under the eighth amendment only requires a state to pursue its penal
goals through more moderate sanctions, courts should resolve doubts.
. in favor of the individual... 78
It is no doubt proper for courts to recognize that the legisla-
ture has preeminence in defining penal schemes and that those
determinations cannot be invalidated merely because of a differ-
ence of opinion on the efficacy of those choices. At the same
time, courts cannot abdicate their constitutional duty.79 Al-
7" See In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 923 (Cal. 1972)("IT]he final judgment as to
whether the punishment [the legislature] decrees exceeds constitutional limits is a judi-
cial function."). The judiciary's role in the government structure was well expressed by
Alexander Hamilton:
[T]he courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Consti-
tution against legislative encroachments .... [Judges are] to guard the Consti-
tution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which
the acts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjectures, sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves... and which... have a tendency..
. to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions
of the minor party in the community.
THE FEDERALsr No. 78 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1966).
This view of the judiciary is not unchallenged. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THm BIL oF
RIGHTS 73 (1958) C'[I]t certainly does not accord with the underlying presuppostions of
popular government to vest in a chamber, unaccountable to anyone but itself, the power
to suppress social experiments which it does not approve.").
78 Gilchrist, supra note 2, at 1150. In a similar vein, Charles L. Black, Jr. does not
defer to what he terms the "slogan" of judicial restraint and he unapologetically charac-
terizes the "negative" action of judicial review-finding statutes unconstitutional-as a
"positive good," in that it can free people from "constriction or fear." BLAcK, supra note
76, at 88.
79 Judge Mulligan challenges Justice Marshall's view, Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d
405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091, 1102 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting), see
supra note 63, of the judiciary's proper role in proportionality review. "so-called judicial
activists, of course, will maintain that the refusal to set aside admittedly harsh sentences
constitutes an abdication of the constitutional mandate, but this requires an understand-
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though courts may be wary of infringing on legislative preroga-
tives, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "cannot be
evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legislatures have the
power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the
reason the Clause appears in the Bill of Rights."' 0 Courts must
diligently guard the demarcation between legislative and judicial
power and insure that the judiciary's role is not encroached
upon, for, at a minimum, courts are "coequal guardian[s] of the
Constitution."' Cases such as Rummel, Hutto, Harmelin and
Gonzalez have shifted the balance too far in the legislature's
favor.82
C. Fears of Judicial Subjectivity
The judiciary's willingness to exert its power of review when
faced with sentencing challenges is closely linked to faith in its
ability to make objective proportionality decisions. Therefore,
the key to a meaningful proportionality guarantee is the articu-
lation of a sensible and workable objective standard to review
sentencing challenges. All sides of the proportionality principle
debate agree that proportionality review should be guided by ob-
jective criteria to the maximum extent possible. This agreement
springs from a common belief that courts should not infuse their
subjective values into sentencing reviews. As the various opin-
ions in Rummel, Solem and Harmelin demonstrate, the degree
to which one believes judicial subjectivity can be curbed dictates
the contours of one's construction of the proportionality
doctrine.
At one extreme are those who believe that allowing any pro-
portionality review opens the door to legislating by courts.8 3
ing of what our constitutional mandate really is ... I submit that our responsibility is
narrow indeed." Mulligan, supra note 6, at 649. But see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370,
377 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)("[O]ur system of justice always has recognized that
appellate courts do have a responsibility-expressed in the proportionality princi-
ple-not to shut their eyes to grossly disproportionate sentences that are manifestly
unjust.").
80 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972)(Brennan, J., concurring).
In re Lynch, 503 P.2d at 923.
82 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 306-07 (1980)(Powell, J., dissenting)("The
Court has, in my view, chosen the easiest line rather than the best.").
83 See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 417. Schwartz expresses Justice Scalia's view when
he states that "the insuperable problems associated with the slippery slope call for a
rejection of activist intervention by the courts under a proportionality analysis." Id. To
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Adopting this position in his Harmelin opinion, Justice Scalia
tries to illustrate how attempts to gauge the severity of crimes
and the appropriate punishments would be little more than judi-
cial guesswork.8 4 Convinced that no objective criteria exist that
can guide the inherently subjective proportionality inquiry,
Scalia is content to rule that there is no proportionality guaran-
tee under the Eighth Amendment. This approach is tantamount
to throwing the baby out 'with the bathwater. Discarding this
constitutional doctrine simply disregards the important function
it plays in government as a counterweight to unbridled legisla-
tive action.
8 5
Another approach which effectively saps the strength from
the proportionality doctrine is the view that the Eighth Amend-
ment "encompasses a narrow proportionality principle."8 Since
there are supposedly few objective standards to guide courts
when deciding a challenge to a term of imprisonment, "success-
ful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will
demonstrate his fear of legislating by the courts, he cites oral argument from the Rum-
mel case:
Question (White):Well, what kind of a standard do you think we ought to have?
Answer [defendant]:Your Honor, the standard ought to be-and I think the Court
could enact a fairly narrow standard if it chose-
Question (Stewart): Enact?
Id.
8 Justice Scalia analyzes each of the three steps of the Solem tripartite analysis and
finds that the first two involve the imposition of subjective values. First, to determine
the inherent gravity of the offense, the court must of necessity rely upon "how odious
and socially threatening" it believes the offense to be. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct.
2680, 2698 (1991). Second, to compare the sentences imposed for similarly grave offenses
in the same jurisdiction, the court must again rely on its own notions of gravity by com-
paring what it considers to be comparable crimes. Id. Although conceding that the third
factor, comparing sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions, does not
raise subjectivity problems, Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, finds fault in that it
infringes upon federalist principles by presuming a uniformity of sentencing across juris-
dictions. Id.
Scalia's position should be contrasted with what has been termed the "commonsense
scale of values." Gilchrist, supra note 2, at 1126 n.38. This scale would mark distinctions
between intentional and unintentional harm, violent crimes and property crimes, and the
extent of harm actually caused or intended. Consideration of these characteristics makes
assessment of the gravity of offenses less subjective than Scalia would suppose. See infra
notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
Although Justice Scalia does not believe that a workable objective standard is
possible, he does not find that there was ever a guarantee of proportionate sentencing
and thus would not characterize his position as discarding the doctrine. See supra note
18.
" Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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be] exceedingly rare. '1 7 While professing not to abandon propor-
tionality review, Justice Kennedy adopts this narrow approach
in Harmelin, essentially leaving the proportionate sentence
guarantee an "empty shell."8 8 What is most problematic in Ken-
nedy's analysis is the type of "rationality" review he performs to
determine whether Harmelin's sentence of life imprisonment
without parole was a reasonable penalty for the Michigan legis-
lature to impose for the offense of drug possession. Kennedy
cites statistics, including the number of doses in 650 grams of
cocaine and the percentage of violent arrestees who test positive
for illegal drugs.8 9 After making the point that illegal drugs are
intimately linked to violent crime, he concludes that the Michi-
gan legislature could have had a rational basis for imposing such
a harsh penalty. Under Kennedy's analysis, only if the legisla-
ture's action is deemed unreasonable will the sentence be con-
sidered grossly disproportionate. This "rationality" test poses an
almost insurmountable barrier to any finding of gross dispropor-
tionality and, while not explicitly declaring so, Kennedy thus
leaves proportionality review a dead letter.90
8 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
88 It is Justice White who accuses Justice Kennedy of leaving the Solem tripartite
analysis an "empty shell." Harmelin, 111 S.Ct. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White's charge is well founded. By asserting that the Solem comparative analysis is em-
ployed only after an initial finding of gross disproportionality, Justice Kennedy relegates
the analysis to an inferior role which he terms a "validat[ion of] an initial judgment" of
gross disproportionality. Id. at 2707. Failing to recognize that the Solem analysis was a
cumulative one, Justice Kennedy then disregards two of the most useful objective factors
the courts have to measure proportionality.
88 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
90 This deferential standard is reminiscent of the Court's full-scale withdrawal from
review of economic legislation in the post-Lochner era. See Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)(in holding a state regulation of opticians not to be in viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated that
"[i]t is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought
that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it"). When a court
applies a rationally related means test, it essentially hypothesizes as to what the legisla-
ture may have considered when it passed the challenged statute. So, without knowing
what facts the Michigan legislature actually considered when passing its mandatory sen-
tencing bill, Justice Kennedy does the work for the legislature and gives it the benefit of
the doubt. See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (1991)(Souter, J.,
concurring).
It is, of course, true that this justification has not been articulated by Indiana's
legislature or by its courts .... [But] [t]his asserted justification for the stat-
ute may not be ignored merely because it is unclear to what extent this pur-
pose motivated the Indiana legislature in enacting the statute. Our appropriate
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Nor was the Second Circuit's analysis in Gonzalez a proper
response to fears of judicial subjectivity. In his Rummel dissent,
Justice Powell remarked that although the Court recognized a
narrow proportionality principle that would be applicable in an
"exceedingly rare" case,91 it did not offer any standard to indi-
cate when such a rare case would arise.2 Gonzalez demonstrates
focus is not an empirical enquiry into the actual intent of the enacting legisla-
ture, but rather the existence or not of a current governmental interest in the
service of which the challenged application of the statute may be
constitutional.
Id.
In addition to questioning the wisdom of applying this "hands off" approach in the
criminal context, criticisms of the approach with respect to economic legislation are also
illuminating. See R. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34 ("Why did the Court move all the vay
from the inflexible negativism of the old majority to the all-out tolerance of the new?
why did it not establish a halfway house between the extremes, retaining a measure of
control over economic legislation but exercising that control with discrimination and self-
restraint?"). Applying this rationale to proportionality review, Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy have accorded undue tolerance to prescribed sentencing schemes by legislatures,
while the Solem analysis offers a method of "retaining a measure of control... but
exercising that control with discrimination and restraint." Id.
91 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
92 445 U.S. at 307 n.25 (Powell, J., dissenting)("The Court concedes, as it must, that
a mandatory life sentence may be constitutionally disproportionate to the severity of an
offense .... Yet its opinion suggests no basis in principle for distinguishing between
permissible and grossly disproportionate life imprisonment."). Dissenting in Hutto v.
Davis, Justice Brennan questioned how the Court could overturn the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion that Davis's sentence was one of the "exceedingly rare" cases in which the propor-
tionality guarantee applied, when the Court did not demonstrate how it determined that
it was not such a "rare case." Id., 454 U.S. 370, 384 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.17 (1983) ("The disent concede--as it
must-that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they are un-
constitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. It offers no guidance,
however, as to how courts are to judge these admittedly rare cases. We reiterate the
objective factors that our cases have recognized."); Solem, 463 U.S. at 303-04 n.32
("Rummel should not be read to foreclose proportionality review of sentences of impris-
onment. Rummel did not reject a proportionality challenge to a particular sentence. But
since the Rummel court-like the dissent today-offered no standards for determining
when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, it is controlling only in a similar
factual situation."); Terreboune v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363, 1371 (5th Cir. 1980)(John-
son, J., concurring)(Although Rummel states that proportionality review is to be in-
formed by objective factors, the Court does not indicate what objective factors are avail-
able to the courts.).
There seems to be a contradiction in attacking a broad scope of review as lacking an
objective analysis and simultaneously recognizing a narrow scope of review without offer-
ing any objective criteria to inform that decision. By holding that any attempt at propor-
tionality review will be subjective, Justice Scal appears to retain the logical consistency
lost by those who adhere to a narrow proportionality guarantee.
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that Powell's observation was correct. Lacking any definitive
standard of review set forth by Rummel, Gonzalez turned to a
"shock the conscience" standard to gauge whether the defend-
ant's sentence fell within the narrow category of cases that of-
fended the Constitution. Although not unknown to proportional-
ity review,"3 this standard was not utilized by Rummel and none
of the cases cited in Gonzalez adhered to such a test.94 It would
seem that Gonzalez was simply filling the vacuum left by the
restrictive Supreme Court cases which were critical of any objec-
tive analysis and yet offered little guidance to courts in these
rare cases.
The Gonzalez standard is troubling in that it undermines
the primary justification for restrictive review-the minimizing
of judicial subjectivity. The "shock the conscience" standard has
been roundly criticized as inviting the use of the judiciary's per-
sonal views in making proportionality determinations. In a va-
93 In Weems the government argued that the Eighth Amendment was violated when
punishments were "so cruel as to shock the conscience and reason of men." 217 U.S. 349,
356 (1910). See also Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1962)(The test
for cruel and unusual punishment is whether the challenged punishment "is so greatly
disproportionate to the offense committed as to be... shocking to the sense of justice.");
Capuchino v. Estelle, 506 F.2d 440, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1975)(following Rogers court, the
court summarily concludes that life sentence under a recidivist statute is not "shocking
to the sense of justice"); What is Cruel, supra note 30, at 55 ("The fear of judicial inter-
meddling voiced by one of the dissenting judges [in Weems] seems scarcely warranted,
for the power to prevent disproportionate punishment is to be exercised only when the
punishment shocks public feeling.").
9' Aside from the Supreme Court decisions, Gonzalez cited United States v. Aiello,
864 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1988) and Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1988).
Neither of these decisions employed the test used in Gonzalez.
"' Justice Black waged something of a war against the "shock the conscience" stan-
dard used in constitutional law. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 665 (1961)(re-
jecting the "shock the conscience" standard), Justice Black states that the test "'makes
for such uncertainty and unpredictability that it would be impossible to foretell-other
than by guesswork-just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of one's home
must be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of the Constitution .... [T]hq
practical result of this ad hoc approach is simply that when five Justices are sufficiently
revolted.., a conviction is overturned and a guilty man may go free.'" (quoting Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954)(Black, J., concurring)); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
407 (1964)("shock the conscience" is one of several "vague but appealing catch phrases"
that "give judges wide and unbounded power")(Black, J., concurring); One 1958 Plym-
outh Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 703 (1965)(utilization of a "shock the con-
science" standard does not aid in interpreting the Constitution, but in amending
it)(Black, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)("[The] Due Pro-
cess Clause with an 'arbitrary and capricious' or 'shocking to the conscience' formula was
liberally used by this Court to strike down economic legislation in the early decades of
[Vol. 68:45
PROPORTIONALITY IN SENTENCING
riation of the "shock the conscience" test, Gonzalez asserted
that "when the offense causes less revulsion than the punish-
ment imposed for its commission," 98 then the punishment is
this century .... That formula [is] no less dangerous when used to enforce this Court's
views about personal rights than those about economic rights.")(Black, J., dissenting);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 519-20
(1969)("shock the conscience" is a "flexible term without precise boundaries" that allows
judges to invalidate laws they simply do not like) (Black, J., dissenting); Foster v. Califor-
nia, 394 U.S. 440, 450 (1969)("shock the conscience" standard permits judges to hold
laws unconstitutional based on "their own conceptions of fairness and justice")(Black, J.,
dissenting); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 396 U.S. 13, 15 (1969)(jury award of
$160,000 in private antitrust suit "does not shock my conscience") (Black, J., concurring
and dissenting); In re Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-78 (1970)(referring to the
"shock the conscience" test, Black states that he would "prefer to put [his] faith in the
words of the written Constitution itself, rather than to rely on the shifting, day-to-day
fairness standards of individual judges")(Black, J., dissenting). See also Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337, 350 (1969)(Black, J., dissenting); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 107 (1970)(Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
Although the "shock the conscience" test usually focuses on whether the court's con-
science is shocked, it is sometimes cast in terms of whether the collective conscience of
society is shocked. This difference in formulation is of no practical significance. In
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359-61 (1982), Justice Marshall cited Judge Frank's
critical view of a standard that rested on whether the "conscience and sense of justice of
the people" was shocked: "[S]uch a standard-the community's attitude-is usually an
unknowable. It resembles a slithery shadow, since one can seldom learn, at all accurately,
what the community, or a majority, actually feels." (quoting United States v. Rosenberg,
195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir. 1952)).
Also lacking faith in baseless standards of review, proportionality critics are in good
company with those who attack the "shock the conscience" test. Di'senting from Salem,
Chief Justice Burger quoted from one of Justice Black's many condemnations of the
"shock the conscience" test-
Such unbounded authority in any group of politically appointed or elected
judges would unquestionably be sufficient to classify our Nation as a govern-
ment of men, not the government of laws of which we boast. With a "shock the
conscience" test of constitutionality, citizens must guess what is the law, guess
what a majority of nine judges will believe fair and reasonable. Such a test
wilfully throws away the certainty and security that lies in a written constitu-
tion, one that does not alter with a judge's health, belief, or his politics.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 317-18 (1983)(Burger, C.J., dissenting)(quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 410 U.S. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting)); see also People v. Broadie,
37 N.Y.2d 100, 111, 332 N.E.2d 338, 342, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 476 (1985) ("Apart from a
subjective evaluation which looks to the extent to which the conscience of the court is
shocked by punishments imposed, there have developed standards to determine whether
punishments are constitutionally disproportionate."); In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930
(Cal. 1972) (court adopts a "shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
human dignity" test but proceeds to use objective factors to decide whether that stan-
dard has been transgressed).




deemed "grossly disproportionate"9 7 and therefore unconstitu-
tional. It would appear that the question of who decides what is
"less revolting" falls to the judiciary and the problem of judicial
subjectivity once again arises. Certainly in Gonzalez's case it was
a simple matter to conclude that the crime-first degree mur-
der-was not less revolting than the sentence-life imprison-
ment without parole. However, the Second Circuit's analysis
would not be as helpful if the question were whether the crime
of possession of 672.5 grams of cocaine were less revolting than
the sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The answer to
that question would lean heavily on the individual philosophy of
the appellate judge and would therefore fail to be an objectively
informed decision. In Gonzalez the Second Circuit has both un-
necessarily restricted the scope of proportionality review and
also unnecessarily set forth a subjective proportionality test.
D. The Solem Tripartite Analysis
The fears of judicial subjectivity which resulted in the vari-
ous formulations outlined above should not compel jurists to ei-
ther abandon or constrict the proportionate sentencing guaran-
tee. The tripartite analysis set forth in Solem offers courts
reasonably objective criteria to follow in a proportionality re-
view."8 Although not perfect, the Solem test does sufficiently
minimize judicial subjectivity so as to make proportionality re-
view more than ruling by judicial fiat.
The Solem tripartite analysis did not suddenly spring to life
in the 1983 Supreme Court decision as a new and untested
method of proportionality review. As noted earlier, both Justice
Field's dissent in O'Neil and the majority in Weems performed
limited forms of comparative analyses. 9 If, as Justice Scalia
says, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating,"100 then the ob-
jective analysis has proved its value in many lower court deci-
sions. For instance, the Fourth Circuit formulated a widely uti-
lized four-part proportionality test in Hart v. Coiner.101
7 Id.
00 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 24 & 29.
100 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2700.
101 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974). Drawing its analy-
sis from Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 282 (1972), the court outlined the following factors
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Although the Hart dissent predicted that the majority's decision
would cause "chaos, '10 2 subsequent use of the analysis neither
resulted in extensive appellate court review when the challenge
could be easily decided nor led to the wholesale overturning of
legislative schemes.1 03 Even though the Hart factors were criti-
cized in Rummel and rejected in Hutto, they were reconstituted
in Solem as a tripartite analysis.' Notwithstanding the ambigu-
ity surrounding the scope of the Hart-Solem test, the tripartite
to be considered cumulatively: the nature and gravity of the offense, taking into account
the degree of violence and danger to the person; the legislative purpose behind the pun-
ishment, determining how well the punishment prescribed meets the legislative goals and
whether the goals can be met with less severe punishment; the comparison of the chal-
lenged punishment with the punishment that would be received in other jurisdictions for
the same crime; and the comparison of the challenged punishment with punishments
that would be received in the same jurisdiction for other offenses. Hart, 483 F.2d at 140-
42. Strikingly similar to the case presented in Rummel, the defendant in Hart was con-
victed under a state recidivist statute on his third offense. The underlying offenses con-
sisted of writing a $50 check for insufficient funds, transporting forged checks across
state lines and perjury. Applying the four-part test, the defendant's mandatory life sen-
tence was held unconstitutionally disproportionate. Id. at 143.
102 Id. at 149 (Boreman, J., dissenting).
1103 In most cases the application of the proportionality analysis resulted in the af-
firmance of the prescribed sentence. See, e.g., Wood v. South Carolina, 483 F.2d 149 (4th
Cir. 1973) (although startling, five-year sentence not unconstitutionally disproportionate
for making obscene phone calls given that objective factors do not show disproportional-
ity); United States v. Wooten, 503 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1974)(sentence of two years on con-
viction of possession of firearm by convicted felon not cruel and unusual); Griffin v. War-
den, West Virginia State Penitentiary, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1975)(defendant convicted
under the same recidivist statute as Hart, but defendant's offense involved violence and
danger to life and property and therefore life sentence was not grossly disproportionate);
United States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1977)(eight-year term for possession
of a firearm as a convicted felon not unconstitutionally disproportionate). See also Chap-
man v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 687, 688 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979)(defendant sentenced to life impris-
onment under Texas's recidivist statute for two burglaries and a forgery, court held sen-
tence not unconstitutional, noting that "[e]ven ... the Fourth Circuit, where Hart v.
Coiner is the law, would likely reject" defendant's Eighth Amendment claim).
In a few cases, however, sentences were overturned. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d
168, 170 (4th Cir. 1976)("[T]he Constitution does not sanction the imposition of a
greater punishment for a lesser included offense than lawfully may be imposed for the
greater offense."); Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.C. 1978)(where un-
armed defendant broke into unoccupied building and broke door of safe with tools found
in the building, 48-50 year sentence under safecracking statute aimed at professional
safecrackers was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime committed).
-o In his Rummel dissent Justice Powell touted the Fourth Circuit analysis, stating
that "the body of Eighth Amendment law that has developed in that Circuit constitutes
impressive empirical evidence that the federal courts are capable of applying the Eighth
Amendment to disproportionate noncapital sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to




analysis provides a practical and objective way to give the pro-
portionality guarantee meaning. 05
In view of the Second Circuit's post-Solem proportionality
decisions, it is unclear why the Gonzalez court failed to use the
Solem tripartite test and why it instead adopted a "shock the
conscience" test of proportionality. With a challenged sentence
that was obviously proportionate to the offense, Gonzalez need
not have engaged in an extended review, but could have readily
held the sentence constitutional with only a cursory application
of the Solem test. One year after the Solem decision the Second
Circuit, in United States v. Ortiz, °06 applied the tripartite analy-
sis and found that a ten-year sentence was not disproportionate
for the possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Applying
the Solem test, the court found the sentence to have no consti-
1o The circuit courts have interpreted Solem in different ways. For example, the
Fourth Circuit confined Solem to its facts, maintaining that a full analysis was only re-
quired where the challenged sentence was life imprisonment without possibility of pa-
role. See United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1988) (Solem does not re-
quire proportionality review of any sentence other than life imprisonment without
parole); United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1990)(finding 14-year sentence
for conspiracy to file false tax returns constitutional, court adheres to the position that
Solem only requires extensive analysis when challenged sentence is life imprisonment
without parole); United States v. Polk, 905 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1990)(also confining Solem
to its facts). The Third Circuit has adopted a similar approach. See United States v.
Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987); United
States v. Whyte, 892 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1989).
Other circuits seem to apply the proportionality principle on a case-by-case basis.
See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo, 676 F. Supp. 368 (D. Mass. 1987)(applying the tri-
partite analysis, court held mandatory five-year sentence for possession with intent to
distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine constitutional); Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166 (1st
Cir. 1987)(defendant's sentence of life imprisonment imposed under habitual offender
statute not unconstitutionally disproportionate given the violent nature of defendant's
predicate crimes); United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1988)(applying the
"Solem/Rummel standard," 15-year sentence with no possibility of parole held propor-
tionate for conviction under Armed Career Criminal Act); United States v. Brown, 859
F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(simply stating that the penalty Congress prescribed was not
cruel and unusual, court held mandatory 5-year sentence for narcotics possession consti-
tutional); United States v. Glantz, 884 F.2d 1483, 1487 (1st Cir. 1989)("no lengthy analy-
sis is necessary" to conclude that eight-year sentence is proportionate to extortion con-
viction); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1989)(ten-year sentence for
drug possession does not approach same level as gross inequity as shown in Weems and
Solem); United States v. Holland, 729 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1990)(in determining
whether 55-year sentence for various drug offenses is disproportionate, only part of the
Solem test that is relevant is the assessment of gravity of crime and harshness of
penalty).
1 0 742 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1984).
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tutional infirmity.107 Nor did the Second Circuit decision that
Gonzalez relied upon, United States v. Aie1o, 208 utilize a "shock
the conscience" standard. There the defendant was convicted of
operating a continuing criminal enterprise for the distribution of
narcotics and was sentenced to a life term without parole. In a
very brief statement, the court noted the three factors to be as-
sessed in a proportionality review and then summarily con-
cluded that the defendant's sentence, though harsh, was propor-
tionate to the grave crime he committed.10 9 Although these and
other Second Circuit cases either did not endorse a broad stan-
dard of review or did not even acknowledge the use of an objec-
tive analysis to inform their proportionality decisions,110 none of
107 The court found that although only a retailer, Ortiz participated in an extensive
narcotics operation which could have readily led to violence, thereby making the crime
grave. Ortiz's sentence, on the other hand, was five years less than the statutory maxi-
mum. The court found that it was not unconstitutionally disproportionate to sentence
street peddlers of heroin as severely as robbers and forgers and that Ortiz's sentence was
consistent with the majority of federal sentences. Ortiz, 742 F.2d at 715-17.
108 864 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1988).
oI Id. at 265. Gonzalez could have decided its proportionality issue in a similar one
paragraph analysis and thereby preserved the Salem test.
The other authority cited in Gonzalez's proportionality discussion, Terrebonne v.
Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1988), had a case history almost as long as that of Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); see supra note 38. Ricky J. Terrebonne, a 21-year-old heroin
addict who had two prior felony convictions, was convicted of distributing heroin and
was sentenced under a Louisiana statute to a mandatory life term with no possibility of
parole. Hearing the case for the fourth time, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane, held the
sentence to be within constitutional bounds. The court noted from the outset that it
found the Solem criteria to be "of little assistance" and further characterized the two
comparative prongs of the analysis as "discretionary criteria." Id. at 503. Nevertheless, it
begrudgingly applied the tripartite analysis. Applying the intra-jurisdictional compari-
son, the court constructed what it termed a "pyramid of severity of offenses" and con-
cluded that heroin dealing could be placed on the same level as second-degee murder,
aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping. Id. Applying the inter-jurisdictional com-
parison, the court found that the Louisiana provision was not "bizarre or outlandish," id.
at 505, and emphasized that jurisdictions often faced "widely disparate situations." Id.
at 504. Finally, in an analysis similar to that Justice Kennedy would conduct three years
later in Harmelin, the court cited the grave narcotics problem and its collateral effects.
Id. at 505. The court simply would not entertain the notion that heroin dealing could
ever be a minor offense. Although Gonzalez may have drawn skepticism of the Salem
analysis from this case, it certainly did not find support for the substitution of the Salem
analysis with a "shock the conscience" standard.
110 The failure to use the Salem analysis does not necessarily indicate the rejection
of objective factors in proportionality review. As Gonzalez noted, Salem held that "a
reviewing court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a
sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate," Salem, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983),
since the vast majority of sentences that are challenged, such as Gonzalez's sentence, are
undoubtedly proportionate. This explains the many cases that summarily dispose of pro-
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them purported to establish an alternative standard of review to
that of Solem. Gonzalez clearly strikes out in a new direction
with its "shock the conscience" test, a direction that, if followed,
places meaningful proportionality review in jeopardy.
E. Imperfections in the Solem Analysis
Although the Solem test has not led to a flood of judicial
legislating, the analysis does not eradicate all dangers inherent
in proportionality review. Critics have certainly not fabricated
the dangers that lurk when courts begin reviewing sentences.
These dangers, however, do not justify courts' turning their
backs on the Solem test. So long as reviewing courts are aware of
the pitfalls and are "sensitiv[e] to principles of federalism and
state autonomy,""' the analysis still serves a useful role in giv-
ing meaning to proportionality review.
1. Assessing the Gravity of the Offense
The first danger involves the assessment of the gravity of
the challenged offense, which is an integral part of the first two
prongs of the Solem analysis. This assessment can lead to the
imposition of subjective views if commonly accepted criteria for
gauging the severity of offenses are not relied upon. Though
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia contend that there
are no commonly accepted criteria," 2 successful proportionality
portionality challenges with little or no analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Panza, 750
F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1984)(with no reliance on Solem analysis, three-year sentence for con-
spiracy to defraud automobile insurance companies not shown to be grossly dispropor-
tionate); United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1987)(with no reliance on So-
lem analysis, 20-year sentence for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute heroin held not unconstitutionally disproportionate given the serious nature of
the offense); Bethea v. Scully, 834 F.2d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 1987)(with no reliance on the
Solem analysis, two concurrent terms of 25 years to life for two felony-murder convic-
tions due to arson held not unconstitutionally disproportionate given the "despicable
disregard for human life" and the particular facts of the crime). Some Second Circuit
decisions have performed somewhat more extensive reviews. See United States v. Per-
sico, 853 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1988)(applying each of the Solem factors and quickly dispos-
ing of them, court holds 25-year sentence for three counts of loansharking and conspir-
acy offenses not unconstitutionally disproportionate).
"I Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 306 (1980)' (Powell, J., dissenting)("[T]he fed-
eral courts are capable of applying the Eighth Amendment to disproportionate noncapi-
tal sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to principles of federalism and state
autonomy.").
12 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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reviews have taken into account such factors as the amount of
violence or injury to persons and the offender's degree of in-
tent.1 ' When courts fail to apply these generally accepted stan-
dards, there is a risk that the assessment will devolve into legis-
lating by the judiciary, threatening the viability of
proportionality review.
Although distinctions between degrees of gravity may be ap-
parent in some cases, not all offenses bear characteristics that
mark them as being either necessarily grave or minor.11 4 Crimes
categorized as malum in se, such as Gonzalez's offense of first-
degree premeditated murder, are easier to gauge than crimes la-
beled malum prohibitum, such as sodomy.115 So, while the
"commonsense scale of values" will quickly show that a forty-
year sentence imposed for murder is not disproportionate, it will
be of limited assistance in determining whether the same sen-
"I These criteria constitute the "commonsense scale of values." Gilchrist, supra
note 2, at 1126 n.38; see supra note 84. To support this scale of values, the author notes:
"A statistical study, asking respondents from a cross-section of society to indicate the
relative seriousness of 140 specific kinds of crimes, reveals that there are widely shared
views on the relative seriousness of crimes, based on a few characteristics of these
crimes." Id. The Solem Court adopted the tripartite proportionality analysis only after
assuring itself that courts were able to discern the gravity of offenses "at least on a rela-
tive scale." Salem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). The Court offered as "generally
accepted criteria" the amount of harm caused or threatened, the absolute magnitude of
the crime (for instance the dollar amount stolen or destroyed) and the lack or presence
of intent. Id. at 293-94.
"" In his Rummel dissent, Justice Powell indicated there may be some instances
where it would be difficult to discern the gravity of an offense:
The Court suggests that an inquiry into the nature of the offense at issue ...
inevitably involves identifying subjective distinctions beyond the province of
the judiciary. Yet the distinction between forging a check for S28 and commit-
ting a violent crime ... is surely no more difficult for the judiciary to perceive
than the distinction between the gravity of murder and rape. I do not suggest
that all criminal acts may be separated into precisely identifiable compart-
ments. A professional seller of addictive drugs may inflict greater bodily harm
upon members of society than the person who commits a single assault. But
the difficulties of line-drawing that might be presented in other cases need not
obscure our vision here.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295-96 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
"I Malumn in se is defined as "an act or case involving illegality from the very na-
ture of the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral, and public law." BLAcK's LAw
DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990). A person committing murder or larceny, for instance, will
know from the nature of their acts that they are engaging in prohibited conduct. Con-
versely, malum prohibitum is defined as "a thing which is wrong because prohibited."
Id. at 960. For example, an ex-felon who relocates to a new area would have no inherent
indication that it was a crime not to register himself at his new place of residence.
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tence is proportionate for sodomy.116
Drug offenses are among those crimes difficult to character-
ize objectively. Proportionality review of drug offense sentences
reveals that courts, unguided by any criteria, often manipulate
facts to cast the offense in whatever light is desired. In charac-
terizing a drug offense a court may either concentrate on the
specific facts and circumstances of the offense or, more com-
monly today, examine the crime in the context of the larger soci-
etal problem with which it is associated, thus aggravating the
severity of the crime.
1 7
"I One could argue that sodomy does not necessarily evidence the characteristics of
violence or injury that are associated with grave crimes. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 197 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring), Justice Powell proffered the idea that a Georgia
statute imposing a term of up to 20 years imprisonment for a sodomy conviction could be
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell noted that Georgia made a single
act of private, consensual sodomy a felony, much like serious felonies such as battery,
arson or robbery.
"" In People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1972), the court held that a mini-
mum 20-year sentence imposed on a 23-year-old first offender for the sale of marijuana
was unconstitutionally disproportionate. In reaching that conclusion, the court described
the crime in relatively innocuous terms. In the district court's decision of Carmona v.
Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979), which held that defendants' indeterminate life sentences
were disproportionate for the sale of one dose of cocaine and the possession of three and
three-eighth ounces of cocaine, the court stated that there was a limit to the "extent to
which the statistical, or assumed, connection between a particular offense and collateral
crimes may be used to justify a particularly harsh penalty . . . ." Id. at 1169.
These cases from the 1970s should be contrasted with the more recent drug deci-
sions where emphasis is placed on the collateral effects of the defendant's crime. It would
seem that a greater societal concern about illegal drugs has led to a different characteri-
zation of the offenses. The Eighth Amendment's protection against disproportionate
punishment should not, however, vary according to society's sense of urgency. See, e.g.,
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2706 (1991)(Kennedy, J., concurring)("[TJhe
threat posed to the individual and society by possession of this large an amount of co-
caine-in terms of violence, crime, and social displacement-is momentous enough to
warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole."); United States
v. Brown, 859 F.2d 974, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (distribution of narcotics is a "national men.
ace"); United States v. Holland, 729 F. Supp. 125, 133 (D.D.C. 1990)(the defendants
"supplied thousands of men, women and children with crack"); Terrebonne v. Butler,
848 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1988)("[E]xcept in rare cases, the murderer's red hand falls
on one victim only .... but the foul hand of the drug dealer blights life after life ...
sparing not even the unborn"). The Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to utilize
a "secondary effects" doctrine in as sensitive an area as free speech. In his concurring
opinion in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (1991)(Souter, J., con-
curring), Justice Souter emphasized that an Indiana law prohibiting nude dancing that
was challenged on First Amendment grounds could be sustained due to the state's "sub-
stantial interest in combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment establish-
ments," such as prostitution, increased sexual assaults and other criminal activity. The
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These divergent approaches to characterizing drug offenses
are well demonstrated in Harmelin. While Justice Kennedy may
correctly emphasize the grave public health threat of illegal drug
use, the numerous victims of the drug trade and the link be-
tween illegal drugs and violence, Justice White may just as val-
idly characterize Harmelin's offense as a mere crime of posses-
sion, which does not require the degree of intent of more serious
crimes and which cannot be directly linked to subsidiary effects.
Clearly, proportionality review will not be a respected judicial
function if judges are simply expressing their personal views as
to the proper sentence for a drug offense. The Solem test, how-
ever, guards against unprincipled review precisely because it is a
tripartite analysis. Justice White has the stronger hand in
Harmelin because his conclusion of unconstitutionality is based
upon more than his characterization of the severity of the de-
fendant's offense. It rests also upon the fact that Michigan im-
poses life terms without parole only for first degree murder and
drug possession with intent to distribute and upon the finding
that Michigan imposes a sentence on offenders, such as Harme-
lin, which is far more severe than that of any other jurisdiction.
Solem unequivocally states that it was a "combination of objec-
tive factors"11 8 which made proportionality review viable. Aware
that it was possible to have many sentences that fell within con-
stitutional bounds, the Solem Court noted that no one factor
would be sufficient to identify a grossly disproportionate sen-
tence.11 9 Given that the degree of judicial subjectivity in these
use of a "secondary effects" analysis in gauging the severity of a crime, however, risks
making a defendant bear the burden for an ever-widening circle of activities with which
she will have increasingly attenuated ties. Although attenuated links may be permissible
when dealing with conspiracies, simple convictions do not have the dangerous propensi-
ties that merit the casting of such a large net. If a jurisdiction wants to address some of
these "secondary effects," it should meet them directly. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472-
75 (White, J., dissenting)(if Indiana were concerned with prostitution and other associ-
ated activities, it has the authority to criminalize such behavior); Carmona v. Ward, 436
F. Supp. 1153, 1169 n.62 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(where there is a correlation between prostitu-
tion and robberies and assaults, jurisdictions will strictly enforce the prostitution laws
rather than increasing the penalties for the other offenses).
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 n.17 (1983).
The predecessor Hart proportionality test was characterized as a "cumulative"
analysis that also looked to all of the combined factors for a determination. Hart v.
Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1973). The notion that a
court's review should be based on several factors can be traced back to Weems. Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see supra note 29.
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drug cases can be palliated by the comparative prongs of the
Solem analysis, Justice White's incredulity as to how Justice
Kennedy can relegate those factors to irrelevant roles is
understandable. 20
2. Federalism and Sentencing Comparisons
The second danger in proportionality review includes the
federalism concerns arising from the inter-jurisdictional analysis
of sentences. There is a possibility that a state's sovereignty over
its penal laws will be encroached upon if it is made to conform
to penal schemes of other states. Proponents of proportionality
review do not, however, claim that a sentence for a given crime
need be uniform across all jurisdictions. As noted above, the So-
lem test contemplates that there will be many possible sentences
which are constitutionally permissible. The tripartite analysis is
designed to test a challenged sentence on three fronts so that
only grossly disproportionate sentences are found unconstitu-
tional. Furthermore, case law has long recognized that local re-
sponses to penal problems, which do not fit into national norms,
are permissible.' 2 ' Moreover, this fear that the "local condi-
120 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2715 (1991). Justice Kennedy was not the
first person to give short shrift to the full Solem analysis. Lower courts often concen-
trated on only one factor of the analysis, claiming to be conducting "abbreviated" re-
views. See, e.g., United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1987)(engaging in an abbre-
viated Solem analysis that did not include an inter-jurisdictional comparison, sentence
imposed for conviction of car theft conspiracy held constitutional given the violent na-
ture of the conspiracy); United States v. Holland, 729 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1990)(the
only part of the Solem test that is relevant is the assessment of the gravity of the crime
and the harshness of the penalty). Solem did state that in most cases a reviewing court
would not be required to engage in an extended analysis, however the Court never made
clear how the scope of review might be limited. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 290 n.16 It is
certain, however, that the Court could not have intended either that one factor
predominate over another or that one or more of ihe factors be discarded. A better read-
ing of the "no extended analysis required" language is that courts should conduct some-
thing like a "quick look" at each of the prongs of the test to determine the constitution-
ality of a sentence. To read the language otherwise would be to disregard the very reason
for having a tripartite test. For a good example of a "quick look" analysis, see United
States v. Perisco, 853 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1988).
"' See, e.g., Territory v. Ketchum, 10 N.M. 718 (1893)(penalty of death upon any
person who makes an assault upon any railroad train with intent to commit murder or
robbery is permissible, given the circumstances of terror and danger engendered by this
particular crime); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1091 (1979)(mandatory life sentence for drug offense not cruel and unusual punishment
given the drug trafficking crisis faced by New York); Bellavia v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 369 (2d
Cir. 1979)(same); Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2704 (divergences in underlying theories of
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tions" exception will swallow the rule of proportionality guaran-
tee is unwarranted. It is possible to objectively compare crime
statistics from state to state to determine whether a jurisdiction
is suffering from peculiar conditions that merit deviation from
the norm.1
22
F. Proportionality Review After Harmelin
Having proved its usefulness and having shown that the
dangers inherent in proportionality review are not fatal to its
viability, the Solem test must still be interpreted in light of
Harmelin. The fractured Harmelin opinion has left lower courts
as unsatisfied with the guidance provided for proportionality re-
view as they were after Solem diverged from the restrictive ap-
proach set forth by Rummel. To avoid becoming enmeshed in a
debate over whether to follow Justice Scalia's total abandon-
ment of proportionality review or Justice Kennedy's narrow
scope of review, many courts have looked to Harmelin, not for
its reasoning, but for its use as a benchmark against which to
compare challenged sentences. This straight-forward comparison
provides a neat and uncomplicated method of deciding propor-
tionality challenges when controlling precedent is unclear. If a
defendant has been convicted of possession with intent to dis-
tribute or has been convicted of possessing 650 or fewer grams of
cocaine, the defendant's sentence will be deemed constitution-
ally proportionate, given that Harmelin's sentence of life inpris-
onnient without parole for the mere possession of 650 grams of
sentencing and in length of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable and beneficial
result of the federal structure). These allowances for peculiar local circumstances are
consistent with the view that the proportionality guarantee does not require a strict pro-
portionality between sentence and crime. See supra note 5.
1 In most cases where courts have found that a challenged sentence for a drug
offense was severe in comparison to other states and where the courts noted the severe
drug problems confronted by the jurisdiction, it is questionable if a sufficient showing of
a peculiar local problem was made. For example, in Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500
(5th Cir. 1988), the court acknowledged that Louisiana's sentence for drug trafficking
was the most severe in the nation and also made reference to the state's "critical narcot-
ics problem" and the legislators' concern with the local conditions. Terrebonne, 848 F.2d
at 504-06. The court did not show, however, that Louisiana's drug problem was any more
severe than that of other states. The court could easily have referred to crime data to
support its position, but this was not done. The negation of the inference of gross dispro-
portionality which arises from the inter-jurisdictional prong requires more than a court
merely saying that the jurisdiction's problems are unique.
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cocaine was held constitutional. 12 3 Harmelin obviously provides
a very low benchmark against which to measure.
Even courts that have not sidestepped the issue of how to
interpret Harmelin find little protection for defendants who
challenge severe sentences. 124 Reviewing courts face an illusory
choice between Scalia's abandonment of proportionate sentenc-
ing and Kennedy's lip service to its continued existence. No
matter what route a court may choose, the outcome will almost
always be identical.125 It is difficult to believe that this is the
23 Unfortunately, many cases have adopted this approach which sheds little light
on the contours of the proportionality guarantee. See, e.g., United States v. Dunson, 940
F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1991) (20-year term imposed for possession of 7 kilograms of cocaine
with intent to distribute not unconstitutional); United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375,
1378 (8th Cir. 1991)("regardless of what kind of proportionality review is required, a life
sentence without parole for a drug crime of Harmelin's magnitude ... is not cruel and
unusual punishment" and therefore defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without
parole for the possession with intent to distribute of 50 grams of cocaine is not unconsti-
tutional); United States v. Torres, 941 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1991)(in light of Harmelin,
"there can be little question that ... a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for
[acting] as leaders of multimillion dollar heroin trafficking organization does not consti-
tute 'cruel and unusual punishment' "); United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir.
1991)(twenty-year sentence for the manufacturing of methamphetamine not unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate); United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1992)(punish-
ing marijuana trafficking with life imprisonment without parole is not disproportionate
in light of Harmelin); Serrano Sepulveda v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 24 (D.P.R.
1991)(ten-year sentence for possession of 14.94 kilograms of cocaine not disproportionate
when compared to Harmelin's sentence); United States v. Garrett, 959 F.2d 1005 (D.C.
Cir. 1992)(thirty-year sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute not
disproportionate); United States v. Willis, 956 F.2d 240 (11th Cir. 1992)(life sentences
for conspiring to possess and possessing with intent to distribute at least 5 kilograms of
cocaine is constitutional). This comparative technique is also a shorthand method when
the defendant has been convicted of prior drug offenses. See United States v. Gordon,
953 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1992)(where defendant has been convicted of a series of drug
offenses, it cannot be argued that defendant's sentence of 262 months was disproportion-
ate in light of Harmelin).
124 In United States v. Gordon, 953 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1992), the court held that a
sentence of 262 months imposed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Career Of-
fender provision for a series of three controlled substance offenses was not grossly dis-
proportionate. A concurring judge notes that both he and the district court were troub-
led by the failure of the Career Offender provision to make finer distinctions between
prior crimes, but that "unfortunately Harmelin requires us to affirm." Id. at 1109 (He-
aney, J., concurring).
125 Thus far lower courts have distanced themselves from Justice Scalia's fringe view
that there is no Eighth Amendment proportionality guarantee, thereby saving the Solem
analysis from total irrelevance. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1195
(7th Cir. 1991)("a firm majority of the Court agrees that the eighth amendment's propor-
tionality guarantee explicated in Solem remains viable"); United States v. Hopper, 941
F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 1991)("although only two Justices would have held that the
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best the Court could do in balancing the rights of defendants
with the needs of society.
Unfortunately courts have readily and uncritically accepted
Kennedy's flawed interpretation of the Solem test. 20 In the pro-
cess Kennedy has undercut the effectiveness of proportionality
review. The most serious shortcoming of Kennedy's approach is
his failure to apply the multi-faceted test in gauging the propor-
tionality of a sentence; he establishes the first prong of the So-
lem analysis (which evaluates the severity of the crime in rela-
tion to the harshness of the sentence) as a threshold
determination that must be met before the comparative prongs
of the analysis may be used to validate the initial judgment of
gross disproportionality. Since proportionality review can hardly
be characterized as a science, the necessity of informing a judg-
ment with as many objective factors as possible is apparent. By
discarding what are admittedly the more objective prongs of the
Solem test, Kennedy has undoubtedly made proportionality re-
view a more dangerous subjective task.127 Kennedy justifies this
eighth amendment has no proportionality requirement, five Justices agree that there is
no requirement of strict proportionality"); United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309 (5th
Cir. 1991)(even while citing Harmelin, court proceeds to use Solem analysis to find 10-
year sentence for nine counts of bank fraud constitutional).
126 Kennedy may find satisfaction by taking account of both Rummel and Hutto
and may chastise the Harmelin dissenters for ignoring these decisions. Harmelin, 111 S.
Ct at 2707. At this stage in the development of proportionality review, however, it is
perhaps best to refrain from performing linguistic gymnastics in order to preserve the
Court's divergent opinions. By misinterpreting the Solem test, Justice Kennedy finds
himself in no better position than the dissent.
127 In lower court decisions that have applied Justice Kennedy's threshold approach,
it is often unclear upon what the determinations are based. Notwithstanding the applica-
tion of Justice Kennedy's threshold approach, some courts still seek out more objective
grounds for their decisions. This need to make principled proportionality decisions dates
back to O'Neil and Weems. See supra notes 24 & 29. For instance, in Tart v. Massachu-
setts, 949 F.2d 490 (1st Cir. 1991), the defendant was challenging a 30-day sentence im-
posed for unloading raw fish without obtaining a commercial fishing permit. The court
held that there was no inference of gross disproportionality given the seriousness of the
violation and the short duration of the sentence. As if to validate its judgment, which
was not based upon any objective criteria, the court stated that "even if [it] were to
conclude that Tart's sentence raised a threshold inference of grocs disproportionality,"
comparable crimes received similar terms of imprisonment Id. at 504 n.16. The court
then cited cases of refusing to stand in an elevator in a federal building and illegal fish-
ing to support its position. Similarly, in United States v. Lawden, 955 F.2d 128, 131 (1st
Cir. 1992), the court held that a seven-year sentence for distribution of 77 grams of LSD
was constitutionally proportionate. The Lawden court noted that "[e]ven if inter-juris-
dictional comparison still remains material under Harmelin, a doubtful proposition," the
defendant could still have received up to ten years imprisonment if he had been con-
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cutting back of the Solem test by noting Solem's announcement
that no extended analysis would be required in most cases. Ken-
nedy has misinterpreted this language as permitting inquiry into
only one of the factors. 128 Solem clearly did not stand for this
proposition: the Court could not have intended to enunciate a
test of various factors from which courts were to pick and
choose. Given that Kennedy believes one of the general princi-
ples of proportionality review is the objective determination of
constitutionality, it is unclear how he can endorse this subjective
test. Kennedy further undermines the Solem analysis by mixing
a rationality element into the first prong of the Solem test. So-
lem never states that the first prong would turn on whether a
legislature could rationally impose a given sentence on a crime.
Kennedy has again injected a new element into the analysis that
throws courts further off course from the sound and objective
Solem test.
CONCLUSION
Gonzalez should not stand as a guide for future proportion-
ality challenges in the Second Circuit. The "shock the con-
science" test adopted by the court not only fails to curb the im-
position of the judiciary's values on legislative determinations,
but it also unduly restricts the scope of the proportionality guar-
antee, thereby undervaluing its role as a safeguard against legis-
lative excesses. When faced with proportionality challenges far
more difficult to decide than that of Hector Gonzalez, the Sec-
ond Circuit will need an objective method to make these deci-
sions. The Solem analysis can provide the necessary framework
for an informed and objective proportionality review. Whether a
defendant in the Second Circuit is accorded a meaningful guar-
antee of proportionate sentencing ultimately depends upon
which path the Second Circuit follows.
Allyn G. Heald
victed in state court. Id.
I28 Justice Kennedy's choice of a threshold test invites the question of why he chose
that particular prong as the hurdle to further inquiry into proportionality. Assuming the
key to a clearer rule for proportionality review is the selection of one Solem factor, Jus-
tice Kennedy chose the wrong factor to serve as the threshold. It would be better to use
the inter-jurisdictional prong as the threshold test and proceed from there. Only if a
sentence were markedly different from that of other jurisdictions would an inference of
gross disproportionality arise and then that initial judgment could be validated by the
less objective criteria.
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